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BIAS PRESERVATION IN MACHINE LEARNING:
THE LEGALITY OF FAIRNESS METRICS UNDER EU
NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW
Sandra Wachter, * Brent Mittelstadt, ** and Chris Russell***
Abstract
Western societies are marked by diverse and extensive biases and
inequality that are unavoidably embedded in the data used to train machine
learning. Algorithms trainedon biaseddata will, without intervention, produce
biased outcomes and increase the inequality experienced by historically
disadvantagedgroups. Recognizing this problem, much work has emerged in
recent years to test for bias in machine learning and AI systems using various
fairness and bias metrics. Often these fairness metrics address technical bias,
but not the underlying cause of inequality: social bias. In this Article we make
three contributions. First, we assess the compatibility offairness metrics used in
machine learning against the aims andpurpose of EU non-discriminationlaw.
We show that the fundamental aim of the law is not only to prevent ongoing
discrimination, but also to change society, policies, andpractices to "level the
playingfield " and achievesubstantive ratherthan merely formal equality. Based
on this, we then propose a novel classification scheme for fairness metrics in
machine learningbased on how they handlepre-existingbias and thus align with
the aims of non-discriminationlaw. Specifically, we distinguish between "bias
preserving" and "bias transforming"fairnessmetrics. Our classificationsystem
is intended to bridge the gap between non-discrimination law and decisions
aroundhow to measurefairness in machine learningandAI in practice. Finally,
we show that the legal needfor justification in cases of indirectdiscrimination
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can impose additional obligations on developers, deployers, and users that
choose to use "bias preserving"fairness metrics when making decisions about
individuals because they can give rise to primafacie discrimination. To achieve
substantive equality in practice, and thus meet the aims of the law, we instead
recommend using bias transformingmetrics. To conclude, we provide concrete
recommendations including a user-friendly checklist for choosing the most
appropriatefairness metric for uses of machine learning andAI under EU nondiscriminationlaw.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Jade had always dreamt of studying mathematics at the
University of Cambridge. In July 2020 her dreams were close
to becoming reality. With her striking past record she was
confident that she would reach the requiredmarks on herfinal
A-level exams. The COVID-19 pandemic had different plans.
Due to the public health risks, in-person exams could not be
held. Instead, an algorithm was used to predict the exam grade
that she would have received based on herprior track record.
Unfortunately, Jade's hopes were disappointed as the
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algorithm predicteda low grade, apparently closing the doors
to Cambridge.
In 2020 many high achieving students in England were punished by a
standardisation algorithm designed to predict grades for A-level exams amidst
the COVID-19 pandemic.' In an attempt to match historical distributions, the
algorithm increased predicted grades at small, private schools and lowered
grades at larger, state-run schools that have historically educated a larger
2
proportion of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic ("BAME") students. As a
result, BAME and poorer students disproportionately saw their predicted grades
lowered compared to their peers.
Politicians and media were quick to point to a clear technical failure
needing to be fixed. But it is worth asking the question: did the system actually
fail, or did it perform precisely as designed?
The "Ofqual algorithm," like many algorithmic systems, was built on a
very simple premise. Algorithms are designed to look at the past, find patterns,
4
and predict the future. 3 Prior hiring decisions inform future hiring, past loan and
insurance decisions are the basis for future banking strategy and decisions,' past

i
The algorithm was designed by Ofqual, the country's regulator of qualifications, exams,
and tests, to combat inflation in grades predicted by pupils' teachers. See Alex Hem, Ofqual's Alevel Algorithm: Why Did It Fail To Make the Grade?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2020),
2
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2020/aug/ 1/ofqual-exams-algorithm-why-did-it-failmake-grade-a-levels.
2
Timandra Harkness, How Ofqual Failed the Algorithm Test, UNHERD (Aug. 18, 2020),
https://unherd.com/2020/08/how-ofqual-failed-the-algorithm-test/.
Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-thinking Data
3
Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and Al, 2019 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 494 (2019); Sandra
Wachter, Data Protection in the Age of Big Data, 2 NATURE ELEC. 6, 6-7 (2019) [hereinafter
Wachter, Data Protection].
For more information on issues of AI used in the workplace, see JEREMLAS PRASSL, HUMANS
4
AS A SERVICE (2018) (ebook). See also Jeremias Adams-Prassl, What If Your Boss Was an
Algorithm? The Rise ofArtificial Intelligence at Work, 41 COMP. LAB. L. & PoL'Y J. 123 (2019);
Mark Burdon & Paul Harpur, Re-ConceptualisingPrivacyand Discriminationin an Age of Talent
Analytics, 37 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 679 (2014); Amit Datta, Anupam Datta, Jael Makagon,
Dierdre K. Mulligan et al., Discriminationin Online Advertising: A MultidisciplinaryInquiry, 81
FAT 1-15 (2018); Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms as
Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COWPAR. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 619

(2015).
For information on algorithms, bias, and credit, see generally Talia B. Gillis & Jann L.
5
Spiess, Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 459 (2019). See also Danielle Keats
Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Processfor Automated Predictions, 89 WASH.
L. REv. 1 (2014); Tal Z. Zarsky, UnderstandingDiscriminationin the Scored Society, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 1375 (2014); Talia B. Gillis, False Dreams of Algorithmic Fairness:The Case of Credit
Pricing(July 31, 2020), https://www.ssm.com/abstract=3571266.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2021

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 123, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

738

[Vol. 123

shopping history will impact future offers and prices,6 previous tenants look like
future tenants,7 and the sentences of past criminals inform risk profiling for
potential parolees.8 Decisions about school admissions are no exception.9 Like
all algorithmic decision-making systems, the Ofqual algorithm was fed with
historical data of not just Jade's past exam results, but also the results of past
students at her school (and others), in order to predict her future.
The algorithm seems to have worked as designed. It adjusted the results
of individual cases to match outcomes with historical data, namely the
performance of schools in past A-level exams. This design also seems intuitively
sensible at first glance and is the basis for many algorithmic systems in society:
looking at how successful past students have been at university will seemingly
give a reliable indication of how comparable students will perform in the future.
It would appear we have "ground truth" from the past that can paint a reliable
picture of the future.
If measured solely in terms of reproducing historical trends the Ofqual
algorithm would appear well designed and reliable. Accuracy of this sort is often

6

For information on Al bias when offering goods and services, see Ryan Calo, DigitalMarket

Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 995 (2013). See also Karen Levy & Solon Barocas,
DesigningAgainst Discriminationin Online Markets, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1183 (2017); Tal
Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRES IN LAW 157
(2019). In view of price discrimination, see Oren Bar-Gill, Algorithmic Price Discrimination:
When Demand Is a Function of Both Preferences and (Mis) Perceptions, HARV. JOHN M. OLIN
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 18-32 (2018); Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, How PricingBots
Could Form Cartels and Make Things More Expensive, HARV. Bus. REv. (Oct. 27, 2016),

https://hbr.org/2016/10/how-pricing-bots-could-form-cartels-and-make-things-more-expensive;
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Algorithmic Decision-Making, Price Discrimination, and

EuropeanNon-DiscriminationLaw, EUROPEAN Bus. L. REv. (forthcoming 2019).
7
For information on bias in online housing markets, see Conference, Auditing Race and
Gender Discriminationin Online Housing Markets, 14 ICWSM 24-35 (2020). For information on
the 2008 housing crisis during which algorithmic tools were used, see JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE
PRICE OF INEQUALITY 239-42 (W.W. Norton ed., 2012).
a
For more on algorithmic bias and policing, see Alexander Babuta & Marion Oswald, Data
Analytics andAlgorithmic Bias in Policing, ROYAL UNITED SERV. INST. (2019). See also Alexandra
Chouldechova, FairPrediction with DisparateImpact: A Study of Bias in Recidivism Prediction
Instruments, 5 BIG DATA 153, 153-63 (2017); Rosamunde Van Brakel & Paul De Hert, Policing,
Surveillance and Law in a Pre-Crime Society: Understandingthe Consequences of Technology
Based Strategies, 20 TECHNOLOGY-LED POLICING 163, 165 (2011). Regarding this issue in India,
see Vidushi Marda & Shivangi Narayan, Data in New Delhi's Predictive Policing System,
ACCOUNTABILITY,
&
TRANSPARENCY
317
(2020),
https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372865.
9
For more discussion on bias and EdTech, see generally Elana Zeide, The Structural
Consequences of Big Data-DrivenEducation, 5 BIG DATA 164 (2017). See also Priscilla M. Regan
FAIRNESS,

& Jolene Jesse, Ethical Challenges of Edtech, Big Data and PersonalizedLearning: Twenty-First
Century Student Sorting and Tracking, 21 ETHICS INFO. TECH. 167 (2019); Elana Zeide, The Limits

of Education PurposeLimitations, 71 U.

MIAMI

L. REv. 494 (2017).
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the sole measure of performance in algorithmic systems. But is such an approach
fair?
The Ofqual algorithm did not malfunction; rather, the design of the
system resulted in technical bias that was not proactively identified and
corrected. Specifically, predicted marks were based on the distribution of marks
from a school over the previous year.' 0 As a result, high performing students at
high performing schools received high marks, whereas high performing students
at low performing schools had their marks capped by the prior performance of
other students and received a lower mark than deserved. In practice, this trend
disproportionately affected BAME students.
Following public outcry this technical bias was quickly remedied. Marks
were adjusted upwards according to teachers' predicted mark for individual
students." Fixing this technical bias did not, however, address the underlying
social bias and inequality that contributed to certain schools underperforming
historically.
In reality, the data used to study the past and predict the future was
biased. It mirrored society as it exists, for better or worse. The cards were always
stacked against Jade. The data reflected the effects of longstanding historical
inequalities in access to good education, tutoring, giftedness programs, funds to
supplement school provided resources, and parental support with schoolwork.
2
Access to these educational necessities is heavily biased along racial and
3
gender' lines, the effects of which are reflected in past exams data.
Biases may have likewise been present but unacknowledged across
Jade's educational journey. Standardised tests, including intelligence tests, have
been shown to be racially biased against minority groups including Roma, Black

David Hughes, What is the A-level Algorithm? How the Ofqual's Grade Calculation
and Its Effect on 2020 Results Explained, INEWS (Aug. 17, 2020),
https://inews.co.uk/news/education/a-level-algorithm-what-ofqual-grades-how-work-results0

Worked

2020-explained-581250.
"

Harkness, supra note 2.

2
The following examples have the sole purpose of showcasing some of the diverse
inequalities faced by certain communities. The cited literature is taken from a wide variety of

sources including cases from the United States and EU. The authors recognize that social barriers
and inequalities manifest differently across different countries, and that specific barriers found in
certain countries (e.g., the United States) cannot easily be presumed to occur in others (e.g. the
UK). In fact, it is of great importance to assess inequality against the backdrop of the culture and
history of a country to ensure that a locally accurate and comprehensive picture of existing
inequality can be drawn. The examples offered here are solely intended to illustrate that seemingly
objective and neutral data can reflect deep social inequalities and that heightened attention must
be paid to the individual and collective social story behind the data points used to train machine
learning and Al and make decisions in practice. JEAN HALLEY, AMY ESHLEMAN & RAMYA
MAH ADEVAN VIJAYA, SEEING WHITE

13

ANGELA SAINI, INFERIOR

120-21, 127, 136 (2011) (ebook).

9-11 (2017).
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people, Latinx, and migrants.14 Encouragement and assessments of Jade's
academic merit by her teachers and professors may also have been shaded by
racial 5 and gender bias,' 6 and ultimately reflected in her marks or reference
letters from educators.17 Similar gender biases may have influenced her male

14

In regards to the Roma people and the EU, see D.H. v. Czech, 2007-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 241,

¶¶ 1-122, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-83256. Standardised testing has a negative effect
on children (i.e., being placed in special schools) and can significantly impact a particular minority
if the class is composed of 50-90% Roma children. Id. This is seen as discriminatory due to Roma
people only making up 2% of the general population. Id. at ¶ 134. See also Isabelle Chopin,
Catharina Germaine & Judit Tanczo, Eur. Comm'n Directorate-Gen. for Just. & Consumers Unit

JUST/D2, Eur. Network of Legal Experts in Gender Equal. & Non-Discrimination, Roma and the
Enforcement
of
Anti-Discrimination
Law,
at
13-18
(2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?itemid=605239. In regards to the United
States, Black, Latinx, and immigrants, see HALLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 40. See also CLAUDE
S. FISCHER, MICHAEL HOUT, MARTIN SANCHEZ JANKOWSKI, SAMUEL R. LUCAS ET AL., INEQUALITY

BY DESIGN 172-73 (Princeton Univ. Press, 1996).
"5
See RENI EDDO-LODGE, WHY I'M NO LONGER TALKING TO WHITE PEOPLE ABOUT RACE 6667 (2020); Simon Burgess & Ellen Greaves, Test Scores, Subjective Assessment, and Stereotyping

of Ethnic Minorities, 31 J. LAB. ECON. 535 (2013) (a study finding that black Caribbean and
Africans are underassessed compared to their white peers and Indians, Chinese and mixed white
and Asians studends are overassessed compared to white peers). In regards to mathematics skills
versus received marks and encouragement based on ethnicity, see Rickie Sanders, Gender Equity
in the Classroom:An Arenafor Correspondence,28 WOMEN'S STUD. Q. 182-93 (2000).
16
See Victor Lavy & Edith Sand, On the Origins of Gender Human CapitalGaps: Short and
Long Term Consequences of Teachers' Stereotypical Biases (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working
Paper
No.
20909,
2015),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/workingpapers/w20909/w20909.pdf (finding teachers' biases
to have a positive effect on boys grades and a negative effect on girls grades); Sue Wilson,
Teachers' Gender Bias in Maths Affects Girls Later, CONVERSATION (Feb. 24, 2015),
http://theconversation.com/teachers-gender-bias-in-maths-affects-girls-later-37844.

As

above

concerning mathematics skill versus grades, the boys' grades improved in the following years.
Girls however received the opposite treatment resulting in long term implications for their
occupational choices and salaries. Their grades went down over time and they were less likely to
take up mathematics and science later on in life.
17
These stereotypes are also reflected in the biased way recommendation letters are written
for male and female candidates. Male candidates are often described as having innate "genius,"
being "brilliant" or "trailblazers," whereas women are often described as "hard-working," "a team
player" or "very knowledgeable." Maggie Kuo, Recommendation Letters Reflect Gender Bias,
AAAS (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.sciencemag.org/careers/2016/10/recommendation-lettersreflect-gender-bias. See also CAROLINE CRIADO PEREZ, INVISIBLE WOMEN: EXPOSING DATA BIAS
IN A WORLD DESIGNED FOR MEN 102 (2019); EQUALITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 80 (Equality

Challenge Unit, 2013).
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peers;18 children have been shown, for example, to already develop clear ideas
of gender roles by the age of six. 19
Jade's experience with the Ofqual algorithm is not abnormal. Western
societies are marked by diverse and extensive biases and inequality that are
unavoidably embedded in the data used to train machine learning. Algorithms
20
trained on biased data will, without intervention, produce biased outcomes and
21
increase the inequality experienced by historically disadvantaged groups.
Recognizing this problem, much work has emerged in recent years to
22
address bias in machine learning and Al systems. Many scholars urge for
23
greater accountability in their design and usage. Machine learning systems take

18

Daniel Z. Grunspan, Sarah L. Eddy, Sara E. Brownell, Benjamin L. Wiggins et al., Males
Under-Estimate Academic Performance of Their Female Peers in Undergraduate Biology

Classrooms, 11 PLOS ONE, Feb. 10, 2016, at 1, 11-13.

19
In an interesting study from 2003 researchers showed that if children are shown pictures of
people doing chores like sewing or cooking, they connect these activities already with gender roles.
See Carol Lynn Martin & Diane Ruble, Children's Search for Gender Cues: Cognitive
Perspectives on Gender Development, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 67, 68 (2004).
Children at the age of five were three times more likely to misremember seeing a girl cooking and
sewing even though the picture showed a boy. Id.
20
See generally VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY (2018); CATHY
WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION (2017).

21

O'NElL,

EUBANKS, supra note 20; O'NEIL, supra note 20.

22

EUBANKS, supra note 20; O'NEIL, supra note 20; Brent Daniel Mittelstadt, Patrick Allo,
Mariarosaria Taddeo, Sandra Wachter et al., The Ethics ofAlgorithms: Mapping the Debate, 3 BIG
DATA & Soc'Y, July-Dec. 2016, at 1, 1-15; Jenna Burrell, How the Machine "Thinks":
UnderstandingOpacity in Machine Learning Algorithms, BIG DATA & SOC'Y, Jan.-June 2016, at
1, 1-12; Aylin Caliskan, Joanna J. Bryson & Arvind Narayanan, Semantics DerivedAutomatically
from Language Corpora Contain Human-Like Biases, 356 SC. 183, 183-86 (2017); Deven R.
Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust But Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J. LAW
& TECH. 1, 1-64 (2017); Timnit Gebru, Jamie Morgenstem, Briana Vecchione, Jennifer Wortman
Vaughan et al., Datasheets for Datasets, 1-24 (Cornell University Working Paper No.

1803.09010v7, 2020), https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09010; Margaret Mitchell, Simone Wu, Andrew
Zalidvar, Parker Barnes et al., Model Cards for Model Reporting, in 2019 CONFERENCE ON
FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 220-29, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1810.03993.pdf,
Tal Zarsky, The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map To Examine
Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making, 41 SCI., TECH. & HUM.
VALUES 118 (2016); Conference, The Problem with Bias: Allocative Versus Representational
Harms in Machine Learning, SIGCIS (2017).
23

See

generally,

e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING

CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA (Basic Books, 2018); KAREN YEUNG & MARTIN LODGE,

ALGORITHMIC REGULATION (2019) (ebook); B. Bodo, N. Helberger, K. Irion, F. Zuiderveen
Borgesuis et al., Tackling the Algorithmic Control Crisis-The Technical, Legal, and Ethical
Challenges of Research into Algorithmic Agents, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 133 (2017); Sonia K.
Katyal, PrivateAccountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REv. 54 (2019);
David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About
Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 653 (2017); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Taming
the Golem: Challengesof EthicalAlgorithmic Decision-Making, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 125 (2017);
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in data and produce outputs, such as decisions or classifications, based on learned
rules or parameters. 24 While biases in machine learning have many sources, there
are two important categories of problematic bias that we refer to as (1) technical
bias and (2) social bias.25
Problems in applying machine learning can induce additional biases that
are not present in the data used to train the system or make decisions; we refer
to these failures as "technical bias." 2 6 Technical biases reflect a failure of
supervised learning algorithms to predict outcomes with the same accuracy
across different protected groups leading to an increase in skewed, inaccurate, or
unequal outcomes when compared to the training data.
But as Jade's experience shows, not all biases in machine learning can
be traced back to technical sources or design choices.27 The Ofqual algorithm
had a simplistic design and did not malfunction. Its failures owed to ignorance
of historical inequality in society and England's educational system. Ultimately
it was the ignorance of social bias that led to technical bias in the design of the
system.

Ari Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, andAutomated Decision-Making, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 613

(2019); Jatinder Singh, Ian Walden, Jon Crowcroft & Jean Bacon, Responsibility & Machine
Learning:

Part

of

a

Process

(Oct.

28,

2016),

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2860048; Conference, Auditing Algorithms:
Research Methods for Detecting Discrimination on
DISCRIMINATION:

CONVERTING

CRITICAL

CONCERNS

Internet Platforms, DATA

INTO

PRODUCTIVE

INQUIRY

AND

(2014),

http://social.cs.uiuc.edu/papers/pdfs/ICA2014-Sandvig.pdf; Jatinder Singh, Jennifer Cobe & Chris
Norval, Decision Provenance:HarnessingData Flowfor Accountable Systems, 7 IEEE ACCESS
6562 (2019); Katherine J. Strandburg, Rulemaking andInscrutableAutomated Decision Tools, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1851 (2019); Andrew Tutt, An FDAfor Algorithms, 84 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 (2017);
Conference, Algorithmic Bias: From DiscriminationDiscovery to Fairness-AwareData Mining,

2125-26 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1145/2939672.2945386 (last visited Jan 9, 2021); Indr6
2liobaite, Measuring Discrimination in Algorithmic Decision Making, 31 DATA MINING
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY 1060 (2017); Laurens Naudts, How Machine Learning Generates Unfair
Inequalities and How Data Protection Instruments May Help in Mitigating Them, in DATA
PROTECTION AND PRIVACY: THE INTERNET OF BODIES 71 (Hart Publ'g

2019).

24

See S. C. Olhede & P. J. Wolfe, The Growing Ubiquity of Algorithms in Society:
Implications, Impacts andInnovations, 376 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC'Y., A, June 2018, at 3-4; Joshua
A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felton et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 633, 642-47 (2017).
25
This simplified view is inspired by Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in
Computer Systems, 14 ACM TRANS. ON INFO. Sys. 330, 333-35 (1996). See also Mireille
Hildebrandt, The Issue of Bias: The Framing Powers of ML, MIT PRESS (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 2-9).
26

Technical bias can be caused by factors such as an inappropriate choice of algorithm,

inadequate features, insufficient sample size, insufficiently diverse data, and data drift. See

Friedman & Nissenbaum, supra note 25, at 334.
Id. at 333-35.
27
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28
Comparatively speaking, "social biases" are very difficult to "fix."
They are a matter of politics, perspectives, and shifts in prejudices and
preconceptions that can take decades to change. Biased outcomes should be
expected when systems are trained on data that accurately reflects social reality,
meaning it captures the biases and inequalities that characterise modern
societies.29 Unequal outcomes are not necessarily a result of inaccurate or
incomplete data; rather, they can be an accurate reflection of the biased and
unequal world in which machine learning is used.
Here we are dealing with a societal problem rather than a technical one.
Adding more data will paint a more accurate and nuanced picture of the unequal
world we live in for an algorithm to learn from or make decisions about, but it
cannot resolve the root cause(s) of inequality; only individual, societal, or
institutional change can. This is a feature of many technical fixes deployed in
"fair machine learning": they are a temporary fix for the symptoms, but not
causes, of inequality in society. 30
Recognizing this limitation, we are left with three possible responses to
algorithmic bias and resulting social inequality. First, we can do nothing and
allow things to get worse. This does not require an active choice; failing to
consider bias or fairness in designing, training, and using an automated decisionmaking process is often enough.3 1 Non-intervention frequently amplifies and
widens existing inequalities in our society that have been learned by a model

We define social bias as any systematic preference to make positive decisions for one group
28
of people (or class of objects) relative to another. See infra Part III. This definition roughly follows
the taxonomy proposed by Friedman and Nissenbaum. See Friedman & Nissenbaum, supra note
25, at 334. Following their taxonomy, "social bias" can be understood as a type of "preexisting
bias" that "has its roots in social institutions, practices, and attitudes." Id. at 332-34. However,
breaking with their taxonomy, we attribute biases arising from both individual and societal sources

as "social bias."
29
Id. at 334.
30
See, e.g., CATHERINE D'IGNAZIO & LAUREN F. KLEIN, DATA FEMINISM (MIT Press, 2020);
Timnit Gebru, Oxford Handbook of Ethics ofAl: Race and Gender (Markus D. Dubber eds., 2020);
Ruha Benjamin, Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code, 86 LANGUAGE
43 (2019); Cynthia L. Bennett & Os Keyes, What is the Point of Fairness? Disability, Al and the
Complexity of Justice, Al FAIRNESS FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (2019); Conference, Roles for
Computing

in

Social

Change,

in

CONFERENCE

ON

FAIRNESS,

ACCOUNTABILITY,

AND

TRANSPARENCY, 252 (2020); Conference, Interventions Over Predictions: Reframing the Ethical
Debate for Actuarial Risk Assessment, in CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY AND
TRANSPARENCY 62(2018); Workshop, A CriticalAssessment of the Movementfor EthicalArtificial
Intelligence and Machine Learning, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 52ND HAWAII INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON SYSTEM SCIENCES (2019); Rebekah Overdorf, Bogdan Kulynych, Ero Balsa,
Carmela Troncoso et al., Questioning the Assumptions Behind Fairness Solutions (Nov. 27, 2018)
(Position Paper, NeurWPS 2018 Workshop), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.11293.pdf; Shira Mitchell,
Eric Potash, Solon Barocas, Alexander D'Amour et al., Prediction-Based Decisions and Fairness:
and Definitions
(Apr.
28,
2020),
of Choices,
Assumptions,
A
Catalogue
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.07867.pdf.
31
See generally EUBANKS, supra note 20; O'NEIL, supra note 20.
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through exposure to data reflecting existing biases and inequalities. Second, we
can rectify technical biases and maintain the status quo to try to ensure our
systems do not make things worse. Third, we can acknowledge the fact that the
status quo is often not neutral and instead use Al and statistical analysis to shed
light on existing inequalities. This can serve as a starting point for technical
remedies and policy interventions that help fix historical biases and inequalities
moving forward.
To date, much work in fair machine learning has focused on the second
option: fixing technical bias,32 maintaining the societal status quo, and, in
general, trying to ensure machine learning does not make society more biased or
unequal than is already the case. 33 This is a laudable goal and will remain
tremendously important, especially given the fact that non-intervention alone
suffices to widen inequalities. This route helps ensure that this will not happen.
This type of response, as well as what we term "bias preserving" fairness
metrics that use the status quo as a baseline, seem to find legal recognition in
Europe. They align closely with a fundamental normative concept in EU nondiscrimination law: formal equality. Metrics that align with formal equality (or
equality of treatment) aim to reproduce historic performance (as captured by the
data) in the outputs of the target model with equivalent error rates for each group.
In doing so, they aim not to make society more unequal than the status quo.
Unfortunately, using these metrics run the risk of drawing away attention from
the underlying causes of historical inequalities and thus can shift focus away
from fixing them.
In contrast, the third response (which is related to what we coin as "bias
transforming"3 4 fairness metrics) aligns with a different fundamental normative
concept in EU non-discrimination law: substantive equality. According to

32
Mitigating technical bias is a particularly attractive challenge to data scientists and machine
learning specialists because they are inherently tractable problems. In practice they can be fixed

&

by improving performance against particular subgroups by improving the quality of training data
in terms of volume, variety, accuracy, or representativeness, or by using machine learning
techniques which better account for bias. See generally Anna Lauren Hoffmann, Where Fairness
Fails: Data, Algorithms, and the Limits of AntidiscriminationDiscourse, 22 INFo. COMMC'N

Soc'v 900, 907 (2019); Abigail Z. Jacobs & Hanna Wallach, Measurement and Fairness,FAccT
(forthcoming Mar. 2021), http://arxiv.org/abs/1912.05511.
3
Of course, this is not to say that a technical fix cannot erode inequality (e.g., collecting
gendered medical data), but more often than not technical fixes only scratch the surface. Similarly,
if machine learning is viewed merely as a neutral tool that can be used for better or worse, picking
a seemingly neutral baseline such as maintaining the status quo seems intuitively sensible.
3
Here we use "bias transforming" rather than "debiasing" to reflect the idea that, as we have
argued elsewhere, bias and the complementary notion of fairness are contextual, and forms of bias
that are acceptable in one context, may not be acceptable in another. As such, there is no singular

debiased state but instead an explicit transformative decision as to what form of bias would be
acceptable in a particular context or application. See Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Chris
Russell, Why Fairness Cannot Be Automated: Bridging the Gap Between EU Non-Discrimination
Law and Al (Mar. 3, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3547922.
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substantive equality or "de facto equality,"3 1 true equality can only be achieved
by accounting for historical inequalities which actively ought to be eroded. The
status quo is not treated as a neutral starting point from which to measure equality
in opportunities and results; rather, protected groups start from different points
which are not equal. Bias transforming fairness metrics reflect this observation
and offer a starting point for possible interventions to address structural
inequality in society.
This Article makes three contributions. First, we distinguish between
two possible fundamental aims of non-discrimination law, formal and
substantive equality, which impose different obligations for developers,
deployers, and users of Al, machine learning, and automated decision-making.
Second, we propose a classification scheme for fairness metrics in machine
learning based on how they handle pre-existing bias (i.e., "bias preserving" and
"bias transforming" fairness metrics) and how well they align with the aims of
non-discrimination law. Finally, we recognize that the legal need for justification
in cases of indirect discrimination may create new obligations for developers,
deployers, and users. Recognizing this need for justification, we argue that
metrics which require an explicit choice to be made about which biases a
classifier should inherit should be preferred for purposes of fair decision-making
under substantive equality. To conclude, we propose concrete recommendations
and a checklist for choosing the most appropriate fairness metric under EU nondiscrimination law.
To make these contributions, we draw on theories of EU nondiscrimination law to show that bias preserving metrics can potentially be
problematic when used as a benchmark for fairness in automated decisionmaking because they only pursue formal equality, not substantive equality. The
fundamental aim of EU non-discrimination law is not only to prevent ongoing
discrimination but also to change society, policies, and practices to "level the
playing field" and achieve substantive rather than just formal equality.
We argue that developers, deployers, and users should, whenever
possible, give preference to "bias transforming" fairness metrics (in particular to
transformative versions of conditional independence) when a fairness metric is
used to make substantive decisions about people in contexts where significant
disparity has been previously observed. These metrics align best with the
fundamental aim of EU non-discrimination law: substantive equality. The law
expects private as well as public actors to play an active role in this endeavour,
even if-as we will show-the precise duties for different types of actors
remains a topic of open debate.
Of course, the use of bias transforming metrics does not automatically
resolve all possible issues under non-discrimination law. Any disparity that may
occur using bias transforming metrics remains open to dispute and requiring
legal justification. However, by making the implicit choice of which bias a

3

MARIANNE GIJZEN, SELECTED ISSUES IN EQUAL TREATMENT LAw 23
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classifier should exhibit more explicit, bias transforming metrics draw attention
to the underlying causes of social inequality. In doing so, they enable critical
dialogue to distinguish socially acceptable disparities from those which cannot
be justified and must be remedied.
Before proceeding further, a brief contextual note is necessary. Our
intention is not to suggest that bias preserving metrics are without merit. In this
regard we can draw a distinction between the usage of fairness metrics in
machine learning for (1) diagnostic, testing, or research purposes, for example
to identify biases inherited by a model or emergent technical biases, and (2) as a
basis for making fair decisions in practice. Testing for and mitigating technical
bias remains a vital area of research. Similarly, when making decisions about
individuals in cases where an explicit normative decision has not yet been taken
as to which biases the system should exhibit, technical bias mitigation helps
ensure that systems are not making things worse. In scenarios where groundtruth labels can be exactly known, 36 no bias exists, 37 or where systems need to
be designed to replicate social bias (e.g., as a diagnostic tool), technical bias
mitigation is sufficient to ensure that no additional biases are induced through
the use of machine learning. Finally, in jurisdictions that only pursue formal
equality, biass preserving metrics may also be acceptable for decision-making.
Bias preserving metrics are likewise not illegal to use for automated
decision-making in the EU. However, their usage in this regard introduces
avoidable legal risks for developers, deployers, and users compared to bias
transforming metrics. We argue that the use of bias preserving metrics for
decision-making in contexts where known and unjustified inequality exists can
give rise to prima facie discrimination. Under indirect discrimination doctrine,
this means that disparity and the usage of such metrics need to be objectively
justified under the "proportionality test." Whilst the use of such metrics can still
be legal in Europe, we recommend that system operators pro-actively provide an
objective justification for the use of bias preserving metrics.

With regards to texting, when developing and deploying machine learning systems, it is
vital to understand and account for the behaviour of these systems. In this context, fairness
measures should not just be seen as a battery of contradictory constraints that cannot be
simultaneously satisfied exactly but rather as a set of measures that can help illuminate unexpected
behaviour, pinpoint forms of systematic errors, and aid in debugging. Bias preserving measures
should remain an essential part of this process. With regards to a lack of ground-truth labels, for
36

example, predicting the outcome of a preassigned biopsy test.

37

For many scenarios, machine learning systems are used to predict a positive outcome

following a positive intervention, for example: "If given a loan, would you repay?" To gather this
data without sampling bias, a randomized control trial would be needed. See also Mitchell et al.,
supra note 22, at 21.
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II. FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY IN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW

EU non-discrimination law prohibits two types of discrimination: direct
and indirect discrimination. 38 Direct discrimination means that a person is treated
4
40
less favorably based on a protected attribute 39 (e.g., race and ethnicity, gender, 1
42
religion and belief, age, disability, or sexual orientation ) that they possess in
matters of a protected sector (e.g., the workplace, provision of goods and

38

See generally MARK

BELL, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002).

See also Erica Howard, EU Anti-DiscriminationLaw: Has the CJEU Stopped Moving Forward,
18 INT'L J. DISCRIM. LAW 60, 60-81 (2018); Justyna Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Direct and
Indirect Discriminationin European Union Law-How to Draw a Dividing Line, 3 INT'L J. Soc.

SCI. 41, 41-55 (2014).
39

DIRECT

DISCRIMINATION,

EUROPEAN

INSTITUTE

FOR

GENDER

EQUALITY,

https://eige.europa.eu/thesaurus/terms/108 (last visited Feb. 19, 20210).
40

See, e.g., Council Directive 2000/43, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22-26 (EC).

See generally Directive 2006/54 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July
41
2006 on the Implementation of the Principle of Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment of Men
and Women in Matters of Employment and Occupation (recast), 2006 O.J. (L 204) 23, 23 (EC);
Gender Equal Access to Goods and Services Directive 2004/113/EC European Implementation
Assessment, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 593.787 (2017).
42
See generally Council Directive 2000/78 of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General
Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, 16-17
(EC). On how Al creates new groups unaccounted for under the law, see Linnet Taylor, Safety in
Numbers? Group Privacy and Big Data Analytics in the Developing World, in GROUP PRIVACY:
NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA TECHNOLOGIES

13, 13-36 (Linnet Taylor et al. eds., 2017); Alessandro

Mantelero, From Group Privacy to Collective Privacy: Towards a New Dimension of Privacy and
Data Protection in the Big Data Era, in GROUP PRIVACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA
TECHNOLOGIES 139, 139-58 (Linnet Taylor et al. eds., 2017); Brent Mittelstadt, From Individual
to Group Privacy in Big DataAnalytics, 30 PHIL. & TECH. 475 (2017); LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA
PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS RATIONALE, LOGIC AND LIMITS (2002); Tal Z. Zarsky,

An

Analytic Challenge:DiscriminationTheory in the Age ofPredictiveAnalytics, 14 ISJLP 11 (2017);
Sandra Wachter, Affinity Profiling and Discrimination by Association in Online Behavioural
Advertising, 35 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter Wachter, Affinity Profiling].
On how Al fairness methodologies fail to adequately account for the socially constructed nature
of groups such as race, see Alex Hanna, Emily Denton, Andrew Smart, Jamie Smith-Loud,
Towards a Critical Race Methodology in Algorithmic Fairness, in PROCEDEEINGS OF THE 2020
CONFERENCE

ON

https://doi.org/l0.

FAIRNESS,

ACCOUNTABILITY,

AND

TRANSPARENCY

501

(2020),

1145/3351095.3372826.
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services). 43 Different groups receive different levels of protection.4 Direct
discrimination is grounded in the Aristotelian postulate of treating "like cases
alike" and treating "different cases differently" unless there is an objective
reason not to do so. Equality achieved on these terms is also called "formal
equality" or the "merit principle." 45
Formal equality is not guaranteed to create equality of opportunity. To
achieve equality of opportunity in practice, it is first necessary to acknowledge
that widespread, structural inequality exists. It is not just single bad actors who
openly discriminate that contribute to inequality; rather, it is the legacy and the
functionality of institutions built on historical inequality that seamlessly
maintain and exacerbate inequalities and inhibit substantive equality of
opportunity in practice. 46
In the words of President Lyndon B. Johnson at his 1965 Howard
University Commencement Address:
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by
chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a
race and then say, "you are free to compete with all the others,"

&

43
For details on scope and limitations, see Wachter et al., supra note 34; Philipp Hacker,
Teaching Fairnessto Artificial Intelligence: Existing and Novel Strategies Against Algorithmic
Discrimination Under EU Law, 55 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1143, 1155-67 (2018); Frederik J.
Zuiderveen Borgesius, StrengtheningLegal ProtectionAgainst Discriminationby Algorithms and
ArtificialIntelligence, 24 INT'L J. HUM. RTs. 1572 (2020); DAGMAR SCHIEK, LISA WADDINGTON
MARK BELL, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL

NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW (2007). For a comparative view, see Raphael Gellert, Katja de Vries,
Paul de Hert, Serge Gutwirth, A ComparativeAnalysis ofAnti-DiscriminationandDataProtection
Legislations, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 61 (2013). On the
scope of the European Convention of Human Rights, see F. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Discrimination,
Artificial Intelligence, and Algorithmic Decision-Making, UNIV. AMSTERDAM DIGIT. ACAD.

REPOSITORY

5

(2018),

https://dare.uva.nI/search?identifier=7bdabff5-cld9-484f-81f2-

e469e03e2360; Janneke Gerards, The Discrimination Grounds of Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 99 (2013); Mark Bell, The Implementation of
EuropeanAnti-DiscriminationDirectives: Converging towards a Common Model?, 79 POL. Q. 36

(2008).
44
For a discussion on group hierarchy, see Erica Howard, The Case for a Considered
Hierarchy of Discrimination Grounds in EU Law, 13 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMPAR. L. 445

(2006).
45
EVELYN ELLIS & PHILIPPA WATSON, EU ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 5 (2012); Christopher
McCrudden & Sacha Prechal, The Concepts of Equality and Non-Discrimination in Europe: A
PracticalApproach, 2 EUR. NETWORK OF LEGAL EXPERTS IN THE FIELD OF GENDER INEQ. 1, 1-50
(2009). For a critique of the circular nature of the merit principle and the need to fill it with
substantive aims and values, see Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537

(1982).
46

&

Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Renewed Equal Rights Amendment: Now More Than
Ever, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 569, 572 (2014). The murder of Stephen Lawrence in UK is an
example of institutional racism caused by omission rather than purposeful action. See ELLIS
WATSON, supra note 45, at 3.
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and still justly believe that you have been completely fair. Thus
it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our
citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates. This
is the next and the more profound stage of the battle for civil
rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not
just legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right
47
and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result.
Providing people with equal access to opportunities (i.e., formal
equality) is not equivalent to providing access adjusted for historical disparities
and their enduring effects on protected groups. The latter, referred to as
"substantive equality" of opportunity (or "de facto equality"4), cannot be
achieved simply by ignoring protected attributes (e.g., race, gender, disability)
and treating everyone the same going forward. A more active attitude that
accounts for social and historical realities is required. Inequality must be viewed
not as something which needs to be proven on an individual basis, but rather as
a background "fact of life" for certain groups that should be taken for granted
unless disproven. 49
A useful distinction can be drawn between procedural and substantive
equal opportunity.50 Formal equal opportunity focuses on procedural aspects of
equal resource allocation. This includes removal of obstacles that affect certain
groups (e.g., word-of-mouth recruitment). While better than formal equality
(e.g., treating everybody the same), it still does not dismantle inequalities (e.g.,
unfair access to education).
In contrast, substantive equal opportunity focuses on positive measures
that "level the playing field" to enhance fair competition (e.g., education or
family friendly measures) in order to challenge established access criteria (e.g.,
51
job requirements) that reinforce existing patterns of disadvantage. Here the

47

President Lyndon B. Johnson, Howard University Commencement Address: "To Fulfill

Rights"

These

(June

4,

1965),

https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/commencement-address-at-howarduniversity-to-fulfill-these-rights/. For an overview of the history, aims and limitations of U.K. and
U.S. non-discirimination law, see Christopher McCrudden, Institutional Discrimination, 2

OXFORD J.

LEGAL STUD.

303 (1982).

48

GIJZEN, supra note 35, at 23.

49

STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 199; Hoffmann, supra note 32, at 904; EDDO-LODGE, supra note

15, at 63.
50

Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 125, 125-

26 (P. Laslett & W.G. Runciman eds., 1962). In favor of Williams, see Sandra Fredman,
SubstantiveEquality Revisited, 14 INT'L J. CONST. L. 712, 723-24, 735 (2016); SANDRA FREDMAN,
DISCRIMINATION LAW

5'

(2011).

Williams, supra note 50, at 125-26; FREDMAN, supra note 50, at 723-24, 735.
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focus is more on restructuring society rather than the individual, even though
formal equal opportunity as an interim step has tremendous value.s2
A.

Indirect DiscriminationandSubstantive Equality

The concept of indirect discrimination was created to achieve
substantive equality in practice. 53 Indirect discrimination "helps to dismantle
underlying power structures . .. as well as to identify areas where further action
is needed in order to achieve true equality, e.g. social engineering." 5 4 Indirect
discrimination is intended to help redistribute resources from the advantaged to
the disadvantaged and to promote diversity in society.5 5 It enables nondiscrimination law to play a more active role in creating substantive equality by
tackling subtle social and historical inequalities. 56
Indirect discrimination occurs when an "apparently neutral provision,
criterion or practice"5 7 that does not relate to a protected attribute is applied to a
population equally but poses a particular disadvantage to a protected group. For
example, a minimal height requirement in a job advertisement is not a case of
direct discrimination because height is not a protected attribute. However, a
height requirement is highly likely to create an indirect particular disadvantage
for women who are, on average, shorter than men. 58 Elsewhere, the authors have
argued that indirect discrimination is the most likely type of discrimination to
arise from Al, machine learning, and automated decision-making because of the
reliance of these systems on inferences and proxies of target variables and
protected attributes. 59
Once a claimant establishes prima facie indirect discrimination in court,
the burden of proof shifts to the alleged offender. 60 The alleged offender then has
52

EDDO-LODGE, supra note 15, at 184.

5
Christa Tobler, European Commission, Limits and Potential of the Concept of Indirect
Discrimination,
at
5
(Sept.
2008),

https://www.tandis.odihr.pl/bitstream/20.500.12389/20645/1/05963.pdf.
54
Id. at 24 (citing GUZEN, supra note 35, at 82; SCHiEK, supra note 43, at 327).
55

GUZEN, supra note 35, at 136.

56

Marc De Vos, The EuropeanCourt ofJustice and the March Towards Substantive Equality
in European Union Anti-discriminationLaw, 20 INT'L J. OF DISCRIM[NATION & L. 62, 72 (2020);
Sandra Fredman, Equality: A New Generation?, 30 INDUS. L.J. 145, 161 (2001); Tobler, supra
note 53, at 24.

57
This language is stated in all EU Non-Discrimination Directives. See also Christopher
McCrudden, The New Architecture of EU Equality Law After CHEZ: Did the Court of Justice
ReconceptualiseDirect andIndirect Discrimination?,2016 EuR. EQUAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (2016).
58
This example is inspired by German case around height requirements for pilots. See Wachter
et al., supra note 34, at 12.
59

Wachter et al., supra note 34; Wachter & Mittelstadt, supra note 3.
For more on this, see Julie Ringelheim, The Burden of Proof in Antidiscrimination
Proceedings. A Focus on Belgium, Franceand Ireland, 2019 EuR. EQUAL. L. REv. 49, 49 (2019).
60
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two options: (1) argue that indirect discrimination has not, in fact, occurred; or
(2) acknowledge the disparity but offer an objective justification. Justified
indirect discrimination occurs when the alleged offender pursued a legitimate
aim and the mechanisms used pass the "proportionality test," meaning they are
both legally necessary and proportionate. For example, physical requirements
can be justified as essential when hiring firefighters on the basis of safety even
6
if they impose a particular disadvantage.
Indirect discrimination differs from direct discrimination by
acknowledging that the social hurdles, struggles, and factual differences facing
62
protected groups must be taken into consideration. Indirect discrimination
acknowledges the differences between groups and postulates that they ought to
be treated differently. This is true even if rectifying existing inequality requires
positive discrimination towards another group, for example more favorable
changes in part-time work and employment law, which can be justified under the
proportionality test. 63
1.

Positive Action and Substantive Equality

Protection under indirect discrimination and the aims of substantive
equality in the form of equal opportunity are similar, but not equivalent to,
positive action (referred to as "affirmative action" in the United States), and
should not be confused.64 Positive action, whilst also a form of substantive
equality, focuses solely on equality of outcomes. 65 Adjusting the outcomes of a

On the practical limitations, see Lilla Farkas & Orlagh O'Farrell, Reversing the Burden of Proof
OF LEGAL EXPERTS IN

PracticalDilemmas at the European and National Level, EUR. NETWORK
THE NON-DISCRIMINATION FIELD 5 (2014).

61
For an extensive overview of EU case law on reasons to justify discrimination, see Wachter,
Affinity Profiling,supra note 42, at 46-54.
62
De Vos, supra note 56, at 72.
63
Id at 74; Sandra Fredman, Addressing DisparateImpact: Indirect Discriminationand the
Public Sector Equality Duty, 43 INDUS. L.J. 349, 363 (2014).
64
ELLIS & WATSON, supra note 45, at 176-77.
65
It is worth noting that the concept of substantive equality and disparate impact doctrine is

controversial in the United States. For a discussion and issues of bias mitigation in the U.S. context,
see generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Substantive Equality: A Perspective, 96 MINN. L. REv. 1
(2011); MARTHA MINOW,

IN BROWN'S

WAKE: LEGACIES OF AMERICA'S EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK

20 (2010); Fredman, supra note 50, at 713; Thomas Nachbar, Algorithmic Fairness, Algorithmic
Discrimination,FLA. ST. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2021); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big
Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REv. 671, 726 (2016); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven
Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REv. 857 (2017); James Grimmelmann & Daniel
Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 CAL. L. REv. ONLINE 164 (2016); Zachary C.
Lipton, Alexandra Chouldechova & Julian McAuley, Does Mitigating ML's Impact Disparity

Require Treatment Disparity?, in ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS
8125-35 (2018); Crystal S. Yang & Will Dobbie, Equal Protection Under Algorithms: A New
Statistical and Legal Framework, 119 MICH. L. REv. 291 (2020); Michael Feldman, Sorelle
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procedure to be shared equitably across relevant protected groups is sufficient to
achieve equality of results; for example, ensuring a 50/50 split of Catholics and
Protestant police officers in Northern Ireland is an example of legal positive
action.66 The decision-making procedure itself need not change.
This is where substantive equality of opportunity differs: It seeks to
create fair procedures using decision-making criteria that account for historical
inequalities. The aim is not merely to give an advantage to certain members of a
disadvantaged group by giving them a better outcome. Rather, substantive
equality of opportunity seeks to create a level playing field for all participants by
defming decision-making procedures and criteria with historical inequalities in
mind (e.g., lowering the weight given to recommendation letters or Grade Point
Average). Substantive equality is satisfied when everybody starts "the race"
from the same point (e.g., via equal access to education or healthcare), not only
when a specific number of people from a certain group have won the race. 67
Indirect discrimination "diagnoses discrimination," 6 but does not necessarily
achieve equality of outcomes. EU non-discrimination law, in pursuing
substantive equality, thus aims to systematically erode inequalities over time. It
fully supports measures for equal opportunity as well as for positive action, even
with some restrictions on the latter. 69
B.

Substantive Equality Is the Aim of EUNon-Discrimination Law

Many non-discrimination scholars agree on the need to move away from
a formalistic view of equality and adopt a proactive strategy that acknowledges
the differences between groups and achieves substantive equality through
structural change. 70 As Ellis and Watson argue,
Friedler, John Moeller, Carlos Scheidegger et al., Certifying and Removing Disparate Impact, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE
DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 259, 259-68 (2015); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, BUTTERFLY

POLITICS (2017). For seminal work on U.S. non-discrimination law, see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING
ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990). One could also argue

that soft tools such as "outreach mechanisms" fall under the term of positive action. See Chantal
Davies, Exploring Positive Action as a Tool To Address Under-Representation in Apprenticeships

77,

53

(2019),

https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-123-

positive-action-apprenticeships.pdf.
66
ELLIS & WATSON, supra note 45, at 7.
67

Fredman, supra note 50, at 723, 729.

Fredman, supra note 56, at 161.
For case law on this issue, see Christopher McCrudden, Gender-based Positive Action in
Employment in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Legal and Policy Approaches in the EU and
68

69

EEA, EUR. NETWORK OF LEGAL EXPERTS IN GENDER EQUAL. & NON-DISCRIMINATION

1,

220

(2019).
70

Fredman explains that "a four dimensional principle is proposed: to redress disadvantage;

to address stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and violence; to enhance voice and participation; and to
accommodate difference and achieve structural change." See Fredman, supra note 50, at 713.
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[i]f the moral basis on which the law forbids discrimination is
that there is a fundamental human right to be treated in the same
way as other human beings, the aim must logically be to produce
substantive equality .. . [i]n particular, it involves taking an
active attitude to dismantling the obstacles which stand in the
way of equality. 7
Similarly, Fredman argues that this active attitude cannot be limited in its focus
on rectification of historical injustices, but rather should aim to achieve equal
distribution of social goods for all people.7 2 To achieve equality in these terms,
differences in "capabilities" between protected groups must be accounted for
73
because not everybody has the same abilities to achieve their goals; rather, the
ability to achieve is affected by "economic opportunities, political liberties,
social powers, and the enabling conditions of good health, basic education, and
the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives." 74
This view is seemingly shared by the ECJ. In 2018 the Court opened the
door to horizontal applicability of the non-discrimination principle in Article 21
75
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 21 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (non-discrimination) is
76
now seen as a general and fundamental principle of the European Union.
Jurisprudence of the ECJ likewise affirms that substantive equality is the
intended aim of non-discrimination law, and that differences between groups
77
must be acknowledged to achieve substantive equality in practice. In cases

7'

ELLIS & WATSON, supra note 45, at 4.

Fredman, supra note 56, at 156, also refers to human diginity as a principle of equality law
72
to prevent levelling down to achieve parity (i.e., treating everyone equally bad).
73

AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM (2001); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000).
7

SEN, supra note 73, at 5.

75

For evolving case law, see Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rudiger Helm, 2005 E.C.R.

1-9981; Case C-555/07, Seda Kucukdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG., 2010 E.C.R. I-21; Case
109/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionoremes Forbund I Danmark v. Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening,

acting on behalf of Danfoss, 1989 E.C.R. 1-03199; Case C-414/16, Vera Egenberger v.
Evangelisches Werk fur Diakonie und Entwicklung eV, ECLI:EU:C:2018:257 (Apr. 17, 2018);
Joined Cases C-569/16 & C-570/16, Stadt Wuppertal v. Maria Elisabeth Bauer and Volker

Willmeroth v. Martina Brolonn, ECLI:EU:C:2018:871 (Nov. 6, 2018).
76
Article 21 states that "[a]ny discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, color,
ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion,
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be
prohibited." See EUROPEAN UNION, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, C

364/1 (2000).
See De Vos, supra note 56, at 81. Among other cases, De Vos cites the following cases as
77
evidence that the ECJ sees substantive equality as the aim of the law Case C-54/07, Centrum voor

gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV, 2008 E.C.R. I-397,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsflanguage-en&jur-C,T,F&num=C-5
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which meet the strict requirements of prohibition of direct discrimination and
formal equality (e.g., no one is treated differently on the basis of sex), the law
acknowledges that systemic inequality can still occur, albeit in an indirect and
more subtle manner. These disparities are often the legacies and the symptoms
of illegal (institutional) discrimination.
C. Positive Duties andRequirementsfor Substantive Equality
While legal scholars broadly agree that the aim of EU nondiscrimination law is substantive equality, they disagree about how best to
achieve the necessary structural, institutional, and societal change in practice.
According to Fredman, 78 Fraser and Honneth, 79 Collins,80 and Barnard,8' the goal

visited Mar 24, 2019); Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita
ot
diskriminatsi,
2015
E.C.R.
I-480,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsfdocid=165912&doclang=EN (last visited Mar
26, 2019); Case C-167/97, Regina v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Nicole SeymourSmith
and
Laura
Perez,
1999
E.C.R.
1-60,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsftext=&docid=44408&pagelndex=0&doclang=EN&mod
e=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6007788; Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rldiger Helm,
2005
E.C.R.
I-9981,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsftext=&docid=185565&pagelndex-O&doclan
g=EN&mode=st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7600685; Case C-303/06, S. Coleman
v
Attridge
Law
and
Steve
Law,
2008
E.C.R.
I-415,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=67793&pagelndex=0&doclang
=EN&mode=lst&dir-&occ=first&part=1&cid=6050215 (last visited Mar 26, 2019); Case C414/16, Vera Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk fiir Diakonie und Entwicklung eV, 2018
ECLI:EU:C:2018:257,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text-&docid=201148&pagelndex=0&doclan

g-en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6616732; Case C-104/09, Pedro Manuel Roca
Alvarez v Sesa Start Espafa ETT SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-08661, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62009CJ0104; Case C-157/15, Samira Achbita and Centrum
voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v G4S Secure Solutions NV, 2017 E.C.R.

I-203,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text-&docid=188852&pagelndex=0&doclan

g=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6030648 (last visited Mar 26, 2019); Case 15273, Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost, 1974 ECLI:EU:C:1974:131, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61973CJ0152 (last visited Feb 17, 2021);
Case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong
Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, 1990 ECLI:EU:C:1990:383, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61988CJ0177 (last visited Feb 17, 2021); Catherine Barnard
& Bob Hepple, Substantive Equality, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 562 (2000).
78

Fredman, supra note 50, at 732.

79
NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION?: A POLITICALPHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 36-37 (2003).

80

Hugh Collins, Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion, 66 MOD. L. REV. 16, 24

(2003).
81

Catherine Barnard, The Future of Equality Law: Equality and Beyond, in THE FUTURE OF

LABOUR LAW: LIBER AMICORUM FOR BOB HEPPLE 213-28
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of non-discrimination law is not just eliminating social economic disadvantage,
but also to foster social inclusion, participation in the community, and solidarity.
Conversely, De Vos criticises the legislature and the Court of Justice for the lack
of clear definition of those substantive equality goals and aims.82
The practical goals of substantive equality remain debated, including
questions such as
" What is the end goal of non-discrimination law? To rectify historical
83
harms and combat traditional power hierarchies? To achieve equality
84
of distribution of goods for all? To accommodate diversity?
* What role (passive or active) is expected of the regulator, the legislature
and the private and public sector?"5
" Should there be a practice and pre-emptive duty of the public and the
private sector to dismantle inequality? 86
" Can this happen at the expense of dominant groups, potentially leading to

positive discrimination?"7

8
" When can disparity be legally justified? 8
9
" How should the law address intersectional discrimination?"
The extent to which the law imposes and should impose positive
obligations on public and private actors to achieve substantive equality is a
particularly difficult question. 90 Positive obligations could require actors to, for

82

De Vos, supra note 56, at 83.

83
See MacKinnon, supra note 65; Fredman, supra note 50; Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Substantive EqualityRevisited: A Reply to SandraFredman, 14 INT'L J. CoNST. L. 739,746 (2016);
Sandra Fredman, Substantive Equality Revisited: A Rejoinder to Catharine MacKinnon, 14 INT'L
J.CONST. L. 747,751 (2016); Catharine A MacKinnon, Substantive EqualityRevisited: A Rejoinder
to SandraFredman, 15 INT'L J. CONST. L. 1174, 1177 (2017) (discussing whether framing equality
around traditional power hierarchies or around multifaceted ways of oppression is better to support
substantive equality).
84
See also Fredman, supra note 56, at 164-65.

85

Urs Gasser & Carolyn Schmitt, The Role of Professional Norms in the Governance of
Artificial Intelligence: Some Observationsand Outline of a Framework, BERKAMN KL[EN CENTER
(April 25, 2019), https://cyber.harvard.edu/story/2019-04/role-professional-norms-ai-governance;
Jonathan Zittrain andJack Balkin Propose InformationFiduciariesto ProtectIndividualPrivacy
Rights, TECH. ACADS. POL'Y (Sept. 28, 2018), http://www.techpolicy.com/Blog/September2018/Jonathan-Zittrain-and-Jack-Balkin-Propose-Informat.aspx.
86
See generally Sandra Fredman, Making Equality Effective: The Role of ProactiveMeasures

(Univ. Oxford Legal Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 53/2010, 2010).
See Fredman, supra note 63, at 363.
Wachter, Affinity Profiling, supra note 42, at 46-54.
89
See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1990); Devon W.
Carbado, Kimberle Crenshaw, Vickie M. Mays, Intersectionality: Mapping the Movements of a
Theory, 10 Du Bois REv. 303 (2013); see also Wachter et al., supra note 34, at 20 (showing on the
lack of legal protection under EU law).
90
See generally Fredman, supra note 86.
87
88
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example, actively promote equal opportunity or even redistribute resources or
jobs. 91 Negative obligations could restrict an actor's ability to base decisions on
criteria that are known to disproportionately disadvantage certain protected
groups. 92
While case law of courts in the EU and UK is clearly moving toward
substantive equality, specific active duties have not yet been formulated except
in a few narrow cases. 93 Nonetheless, several possible grounds for broad positive
duties have been identified.
In the UK, for example, the justification defense and the public sector
equality duty may together create a duty for public bodies to set pre-emptive
measures (i.e., without litigation) to prevent indirect discrimination if there are
reasons to suspect that illegal disparity may occur. 94 In general, proactive
measures of the private and the public sector might be more fruitful than just a
complaint-based system. Reflecting this, some Member States have chosen this
option. 95 However, a clear and general legal duty for preventative, positive duty

91
92

ELLis & WATSON, supra note 45, at 7.
Such obligations raise further questions. For example, should banks be able to grant loans
based on the financial situations of the clients? Should banks be required to use different or
additional decision criteria that would level the playing field and give marginalized groups access
to financial services? Similarly, under what circumstances can disparity be justified? For example,
should a bank be able to justify indirect discrimination by establishing that it was necessary to

consider income to achieve a legitimate interest? A legitimate interest in this case would be to only
grant loans to applicants that are able to repay them. This practice can serve the interests of both
the bank (i.e., to have loans repaid) and the loan applicant (i.e., to not be given an unpayable loan),
but will exclude certain people from the market.
93
De Vos, supra note 56, at 72-73. Fredman, supra note 50, at 723-24, 735 (highlighting
cases dealing with discrimination based on disability recognize a duty for "reasonable
accommodation").
94
Fredman, supra note 63, at 363. Fredman thinks that in relation to public bodies in the UK
in cases where indirect discrimination is likely to occur, a duty to take pre-emptive measures
(including the duty to restructure) exists, but is unsure of whether a general pre-emptive duty for

public bodies to actively dismantle inequality under the justification defense also exists. Id
95
Fredman also criticises the ineffectiveness of complaint based systems, the lack of
protection for claimants, the low conviction rates, and the high social and economic costs for (often
very slow) litigation as well as the high hurdles in relation to the burden of proof (e.g., access to
evidence, lack of comparator). Fredman, supra note 86, at 1-5. Complaints often do not deter
perpetrators. Id Proactive measures on the other hand would benefit everyone and not just the
claimant and would contribute to the systematic erosion of inequality. Id (discussing that some of

the Member States have implemented mandatory (for the private and public sector as well as for
trade unions) and optional rules (e.g., with incentives)).
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9
97
96
is not yet established. Nonetheless, De Vos, Tobler, and Fredman 8 have
argued that an implicit duty based on the existence of the prohibition of indirect
discrimination should be inferred from EU law for both the public and private
sectors, regardless of whether the institution in question was responsible for the
inequality. 99 Nonetheless, it remains an open question as to what precisely these
duties should entail.
Fitting with this argument for substantial change, Fredman believes that
in cases where illegal direct or indirect discrimination occurred the outcome
100
should not just be individual compensation but a requirement of restructuring.
Individual compensation cannot bring about structural change if not paired with
a duty to restructure. Italy and Ireland, for example, have regulations that
stipulate that if a claim is successful, the perpetrator is required to remove the
discriminatory practice. Other legal remedies to bolster the complaints-based
system and lessen the burden on individuals include strengthening the oversight
10
powers of equality bodies and collective redress mechanisms.
When dealing with scarce resources this restructuring can of course
03
02
mean that traditional benefactors lose out. However, EU law and case law
support measures of equal opportunity as well as positive action (with some
restrictions) 4 to support societal and systemic restructuring. This holds true
even if restructuring means that historically dominant groups receive less

96
See De Vos, supra note 60, at 71 ("A limited duty of preventive positive action is therefore
implicit in the prohibition of indirect discrimination."); see also MARC DE Vos, BEYOND FORMAL
EQUALITY: POSITIVE ACTION UNDER DIRECTIVES 2000/43/EC AND 2000/78/EC 81 (2007).
LIMITS AND POTENTIAL OF THE CONCEPT OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 53, at 92.
97

Fredman, supra note 56, at 164, 167; Fredman, supra note 50, at 735 ("So far as EU law is
98
concerned, the race directive does not specifically require the imposition of positive duties,
although they are of course permitted. It instead stops at requiring a body to promote equal
treatment and the obligation to promote social dialogue and encourage civil dialogue. At the same

time, a degree of positive action is permitted.").
Fredman, supra note 56, at 164; Fredman, supra note 50, at 735.
Fredman, supra note 56, at 163.
101
On removing the discriminatory practice, see Fredman, supra note 86, at 5. On oversight
powers, see European Network of Equality Bodies, Meeting the New Challenges to Equality and
Non-Discrimination from Increased Digitisation and the Use of Artificial Intelligence,
2
https://equineteurope.org/wp-content/uploads/20 0/06/ai_summarydigital.pdf (last visited Feb.
17, 2021). On collective redress, see Sara Benedi Lahuerta, Enforcing EUEqualityLaw Through
Collective Redress: Lagging Behind?, 55 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 783 (2018).
102
Fredman, supra note 63, at 363.
99
100

103

De Vos, supra note 56, at 74-75.

104

See McCrudden, supra note 69, at 220 (discussing case law on this issue).
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favorable treatment and (potential) positive discrimination occurs.10 5 Both can
be justified under the EU's proportionality test. 106
III. BIAS PRESERVATION IN FAIR MACHINE LEARNING

The existence and precise requirements imposed by positive substantive
equality duties for the public and private sector remain an open question, but one
that is critically important to the field of machine learning. Developers and users
in both the public and private sector may have a duty to promote substantive
equality in decision-making aided or driven by machine learning and derived
technologies. Moreover, fairness and bias are growing areas of research in
machine learning, with increasing attention being given to the intersection of
technical metrics of fairness with the law. In both cases, designing technical
capacities to meet current and future legal requirements concerning substantive
equality is prudent. Matching technical capacities to measure bias and inequality
with the aim and duties associated with non-discrimination law is thus of critical
importance for developers and users of machine learning and Al.
To this end, in this section we propose a classification scheme for
fairness metrics in machine learning based on the fundamental legal distinction
between formal and substantive equality. We distinguish between metrics based
on their treatment of historical social bias which affects their ability to support
substantive equality in practice. We define social bias as any systematic
preference to make positive decisions for one group of people (or class of
objects) relative to another. In this formulation bias is a neutral concept, whereas
the effects of the bias can be normatively significant.
Bias often carries a negative connotation because of its abstract
formulation or effects in a given decision-making context. For example, if a loan
officer has a bias to give loans at a greater rate to men compared to women, we
can find the end state (i.e., men having greater access to loans than women)
normatively problematic for a variety of reasons, following basic theoretical
distinctions in moral and political philosophy.' 07 The bias could be rejected for
bringing about negative consequences, or violating some fundamental ethical

105

See De Vos, supra note 56, at 81 ("However strict its case law may be, the fact remains that

the Court does make room in principle for positive discrimination beyond mere positive action, as
an exception to formal neutrality.").
106
Fredman, supra note 63, at 363.
107
We could argue that the bias violates an ethical principle of gender equality. We could
likewise find the consequences of such a bias problematic in practice; over time, the preference
would lead to men having greater access to financial services than women and thus greater ability

to start businesses, purchase property, or otherwise engage in the market. From a legal perspective,

we could find the loan officer's bias problematic because it factored gender, a legally protected
attribute, into decisions regarding access to goods or services.
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principle, or simply contravening legal provisions against direct
discrimination.' 08
As is typically the case in fair machine learning research, throughout this
Article we discuss bias with a negative connotation. Specifically, we view certain
social biases in past decision-making as problematic because of the inequality
09
they have created between protected groups of people in Western society.'
From this observation we argue that preserving these biases in machine learning
models can be problematic. If one were to reject the argument that existing
inequality is in fact a problem, then one could likewise reject the argument that
10
preserving that bias in fair machine learning is problematic.4
FairnessMetrics and Non-Discrimination Law

A.

The concept of "indirect discrimination" and the "proportionality test"
connect EU non-discrimination law with contemporary notions of algorithmic
fairness. 1" In particular, some of the tests used by the European Court of Justice
and Member State courts to measure indirect discrimination match the metric of
demographic parity from algorithmic fairness." 2
Formally, the definition of demographic parity asserts that each
protected group, meaning a group based on a protected attribute such as race or
gender, should, if it receives k% of the positive decisions, then also receive kO
percent of the negative decisions.
Building from this observation, Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Russell' '3 and
Wachter' '4 examine the justification of apparent indirect discrimination, by
which a practice that would otherwise be considered discriminatory can be
5
justified on the basis of a legitimate interest and the proportionality test."

108

Supra Part II.

109

More precisely, in this Article we treat social inequality as problematic because European
non-discrimination law aims at substantive equality between groups. Inequality can, of course, also
be criticised on many other legal, ethical, and political grounds.
"10
Throughout this Article we assume that the reader finds at least some of the inequality that
currently exists in the world normatively problematic.
1
See Wachter et al., supra note 34.
112
Id at 48-54. We also emphasize that the courts do not expect decision-making systems to
perfectly satisfy demographic parity. Rather, other points to be considered include the impact, or
potential harm, of the decision on each individual; the number of people impacted by the system;

and the size of the systematic violation of demographic parity. Id.
"13

Id.

at 41-44.

Wachter, Affinity Profiling, supra note 42, at 46-54.
115
See id. at 41-44 (detailing the ECJ case law on what can be objectively justified); see also
supra SectionII.A. Further, examples can be seen in the application of the UK Equality Act 2010
that transposes the EU Non-Discrimination Directives. See Words and Terms Used in the Equality
Act, EQUALITY & HUM. RTs. COMM'N https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/advice-and"4

guidance/commonly-used-terms-equal-rights (last visited Feb. 28, 2020). Here the UK Equality

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2021

25

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 123, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 4
760

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123

Justifications can, in principle, be offered to defend systems that apparently
cause indirect discrimination by violating demographic parity.
We have argued elsewhere that if justification is accepted as a defense
this should imply that the system as a whole should satisfy the algorithmic
fairness notion of Conditional Demographic Parity (also referred to as
Conditional Independence in the statistical literature). This metric can be tested
in practice. Elsewhere we have proposed a simple metric for robustly estimating
the effect size of conditional systematic bias: Conditional Demographic
Disparity ("CDD"). 1 6
A decision-making system is said to exhibit Conditional Independence,
with respect to a particular protected attribute, such as race or sex, and a
conditioning attribute, such as salary or length of employment, if
(1) any difference in how the system collectively treats people with a
particular race or sex can be attributed entirely to differences in the
conditioning attribute; and
(2) after conditioning on this variable, the decisions made are
statistically independent of the protected group.
Much as conditional independence explicitly encodes a dependence on
a deliberately selected conditioning attribute, a class of metrics we refer to as
"bias preserving" should be recognized as an explicit dependence on target
labels. As such, bias preserving metrics implicitly advance an answer to a
difficult normative question: what is the right factor to depend on in a given use
case? By answering this question, these metrics also assume that a single correct
answer can be given for a wide range of challenging use cases. This characteristic
of bias preserving metrics is particularly pronounced for equalized odds, which
is formally defined as a special case of conditional independence that conditions
on the target labels.'"7 However, it also holds for other bias preserving metrics
that, by matching error rates across groups, are in one form or another seeking
to preserve the distribution of target labels.

and Human Rights Commission offers the following guidance on requirements for an objective
justification that would satisfy the courts. Id. The justification must show that "the aim must be a
real, objective consideration, and not in itself discriminatory (for example, ensuring the health and

safety of others would be a legitimate aim); if the aim is simply to reduce costs because it is cheaper
to discriminate, this will not be legitimate; working out whether the means is "proportionate" is a
balancing exercise: does the importance of the aim outweigh any discriminatory effects of the
unfavorable treatment?; there must be no alternative measures available that would meet the aim
without too much difficulty and would avoid such a discriminatory effect: if proportionate

alternative steps could have been taken, there is unlikely to be a good reason for the policy or agebased rule." Id.
116

Wachter et al., supranote 34.

"7

See Moritz Hardt, Eric Price & Nati Srebro, Equality of Opportunityin Supervised Learning,

in ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 3315-23 (Daniel D. Lee et al. eds.,

2016).
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To this end, the application of indirect discrimination provides a model
of key questions that should be asked and answered before algorithmic fairness
metrics are used in practice. The questions are asked with an eye toward the
future: we imagine a hypothetical scenario where a given algorithmic decisionmaking application is contested in court for causing indirect discrimination. In
this context two key questions must be answered:
(1) Does significant disparity exist?
(2) Accepting that significant disparity exists, is it justified?
Developers and users of machine learning should ideally proactively
answer these questions at the point of deployment with an eye towards future
liability, but also to demonstrate a commitment to substantive rather than merely
formal equality.
The first question concerns how we define relevant groups (i.e.,
disadvantaged and comparator groups), and how we measure disparity between
them. For our purposes here we ignore the former which we have addressed in
detail elsewhere.' 18 With regards to the latter, the first question can be rephrased
as: which fairness metric should we use to measure disparity? And, more
specifically, which variable(s) should the test be conditioned on? This is a key
normative question, as the answer can result in potentially problematic inequality
being ignored or obscured from view, particularly when it is a result of past
biases and inequalities.
B. Bias Preservingand Bias TransformingFairnessMetrics
To help answer these questions in the context of a legal framework
designed for substantive equality, we define two types of fairness metrics. "Bias
preserving" fairness metrics seek to reproduce historic performance in the
outputs of the target model with equivalent error rates for each group as reflected
in the training data (or status quo). In contrast, "bias transforming" metrics do
not blindly accept social bias as a given or neutral starting point that should be
preserved, but instead require people to make an explicit decision as to which
biases the system should exhibit.
To formalise our notion of bias preserving fairness, we say that any
fairness metric is bias preserving if it is always satisfied by a perfect classifier
that exactly predicts its target labels with zero error, replicating bias present in
the data. Fairness metrics that are not necessarily satisfied by a perfect classifier,
we refer to as bias transforming. 19
To understand how existing fairness metrics should be classified, we
refine our hypothetical scenario to one where a machine learning system is
trained to make decisions f, such as if an individual will be hired, based on

118

Wachter et al., supra note 34, at 13-32.

As a negative category, metrics classified as bias transforming will be less homogeneous
119
than those classified as bias preserving.
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historic target data Y. Y could come from various sources, for example, the
system could be trained on historic data such as who was previously hired, or
who passed probation and became a permanent employee. Metrics that can be
classified as bias preserving, such as "equalized odds,"120 equal opportunity,1 2 1
and calibration,12 2 implicitly assume that various forms of bias in the historic
data Y are there for a reason and should be preserved. 23
This treatment of the status quo and existing bias as neutral, or as
something to be preserved, can be troubling for a variety of reasons. Past hiring
decisions reflect the biases of past hiring managers, while the seemingly more
objective criteria of passing probation introduces a collection of potential causes
of bias. For example, failure to pass probation may reflect a hostile working
environment, and of course such data can only exist for people that were
previously hired by the hiring manager.
Returning to the fairness metrics in question, equalized odds is formally
defined as: "predictor f satisfies equalized odds with respect to protected
attribute A and outcome Y if f and A are independent, conditional on Y," where
Y is the output of a system, and Y, some input labels the system is trying to

predict. 124
Based on this definition, equalized odds is a form of conditional
independence or conditional demographic parity, conditioned on historic data Y,
and reflecting its biases exactly. The problem is that blind application of
equalized odds locks in these historical biases without providing a justification
for relying on the metric, and thus the historic biases, going forward. From the
perspective of EU non-discrimination law, which requires justification when
prima facie discrimination is established, 2 1 using bias preserving metrics in
contexts where discrimination or significant, unjustified disparity has been
previously established can cause a problem for developers, deployers, and users.
Specifically, we suggest that doing so effectively provides potential claimants
with evidence of prima facie discrimination and shifts the burden of proof to the
alleged offender to justify the disparity.1 2 6
The relationship between conditional independence and other fairness
metrics is not as mathematically exact. However, all these metrics have in
common the idea that bias present in the target labels data is meant to be there,

120
121

Hardt, Price, & Srebro, supra note 117.

122

Chouldechova, supra note 8.

23

A full taxonomy of fairness metrics along with references is provided in Appendix 1, Table

Id.

1 a.
24

Hardt, Price, & Srebro, supra note 117. Here we use equalized odds as an example because

it is self-evidently bias preserving. Specifically, it is functionally a type of conditional
independence that conditions on the target labels and thus preserves the labels' bias.
125
Wachter et al., supra note 34, at 41-44.
126
Infra Part V.
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and a perfect classifier that exactly reproduces the given labels (i.e., Y= ') would
satisfy all such metrics. As such, all of these metrics should be understood as
trying to prevent machine learning systems from inserting new bias into a system
by preserving the bias present in the data.12 7 We refer to such fairness metrics as
bias preserving.
This observation naturally raises a question: how common is bias
preservation in fairness metrics proposed in the fair machine learning literature?
A 2018 "state of the art" review identified 20 distinct metrics, 13 of which are
bias preserving by definition. 12 8
According to our definition, a fairness metric can be classified as bias
preserving if a perfect classifier Y= Yis guaranteed to exactly satisfy the metric.
In such cases, a decision about whether the biases present in the labelled data Y
are acceptable should be made before the metric is used. This does not mean that
the other fairness metrics would be appropriate to use, simply that other
questions need to be asked.

Fairness metric
1. Group fairness,

Statistical (demographic)

Bias
preserving?
X

parity

X

2. Conditional statistical (demographic) parity,
Conditional independence
3. Predictive parity, outcome test

J

In behavioral economics terms, such metrics display "status quo bias," meaning their design
127
reflects a preference for maintaining the status quo. See William Samuelson & Richard
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
128
Sahil Verma & Julia Rubin, Fairness Definitions Explained, 2018 IEEE/ACM INT'L
WORKSHOP ON SOFTWARE FAIRNESS 1; see also Table 1. For further reading on the topic of different
(competing) fairness definitions, see also Reuben Binns, On the Apparent Conflict Between
Individual and Group Fairness, in 2020 PROCEDURES OF CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS,
ACCOUNTABILITY, & TRANSPARENCY 514; Sorelle A. Friedler, Carlos Scheidegger & Suresh

Venkatasubramanian,
On the
https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.07236.pdf;

(Im)possibility
of Fairness
(Sept.
23,
2016),
Meike Zehlike, Philipp Hacker & Emil Wiedemann,

Matching Code and Law: Achieving Algorithmic Fairness with Optimal Tansport (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.07924.pdf; Alice Xiang & Inioluwa Deborah Raji, On the Legal

Compatibility of Fairness Definitions (Nov. 25, 2019) (Workshop paper, NeurIPS 2019),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.00761.pdf, Martim Brandio, Helena Webb, Marina Jirotka & Paul Luff,
FairNavigation Planning: A Resource for Characterizingand Designing Fairness in Mobile

Robots, 282

A.I.

103259

(2020);

Sorelle

A.

Friedler,

Carlos

Scheidegger,

Suresh

Venkatasubramanian, Sonam Choudhary et al., A Comparative Study of Fairness-Enhancing
Interventions in Machine Learning, in 2019 PROCEDURES OF CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 329; Deborah Hellman, Measuring Algorithmic Fairess,
106 VA. L. REv. 56 (2020).
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1

4. False positive error rate balance
5. False negative error rate balance, Equal

~

opportunity
6. Equalized odds

~

7. Conditional use accuracy equality

8. Overall accuracy equality

*

*

.

9. Treatment equality
~
10. Test-fairness or calibration
~
11. Well-calibration
12. Balance for positive class
~
13. Balance for negative class
discrimination
(direct
14. Causal
discrimination)
15. Fairness through unawareness
16. Fairness through awareness
X
17. Counterfactual fairness
X
18. No unresolved discrimination
X
19. No proxy discrimination
X
X
20. Path based causal reasoning
Table 1 - Bias preserving fairness metrics
* Indicates that a perfect classifier satisfying Y= Y would always satisfy this
definition if perfect predictions can be made without explicitly using the
protected attribute such as race or sex. N.B. Formulas and references for each
metric can be found in Appendix 1, Table 1a.
The fact that one classifier can satisfy multiple fairness metrics might be
somewhat surprising given the variety of impossibility theorems that state that
they are incompatible. However, these theorems explicitly exclude perfect
classifiers as special cases.1 2 9 As such, the differences and incompatibilities
between different bias preserving fairness metrics should be understood as
engineering decisions that alter how the system balances misclassification errors,
but that does not change the suitability of a perfect classifier. In other words, the
choice of bias preserving metrics is essentially a decision about how properties
of the target variable distribution should be preserved by a new classifier. As a
result, a perfect classifier that preserves all properties of the target distribution
with zero error satisfies all of these metrics.

Chouldechova, supra note 8; Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan & Manish Raghavan,
Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.05807.pdf, Geoff Pleiss, Manish Raghavan, Felix Wu, John Kleinberg
et al., On Fairness and Calibration (Nov. 3, 2017) (Conference paper, NIPS 2017),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.02012.pdf, Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan, Cass R.
Sunstein et al., Discriminationin the Age ofAlgorithms, 10 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 113 (2018).
129
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C. Limits of Bias Preservingand Transforming Metrics

'

Within the current literature, the key difference between bias
transforming and bias preserving metrics is that most bias transformingmetrics
are satisfied by matching decision rates between groups, while bias preserving
metrics typically require matching errorrates between groups. For example, the
bias transforming metric demographic parity is satisfied if positive decisions are
made at the same rate across the relevant groups, e.g., if x% of both Black and
white people receive positive decisions. Conditional demographic parity
(conditioning on salary) is satisfied if x% of both Black and white people earning
over a threshold receive positive decisions and also some y% of both Black and
white people earning under the threshold receive positive decisions.
Other bias transforming fairness metrics include causal methods such as
counterfactual fairness.130 These methods explicitly model forms of societal bias
using structured causal models in order to eliminate them. More sophisticated
variants allow for explicit normative decisions as to which forms of bias should
3
be preserved in the form of path-specific effects defined over the causal graph.1
In contrast, bias preserving metrics typically match error rate across
groups. For example, equalized odds requires the ratio of true positive to false
negative decisions to be the same across groups, and for the ratio of true
negatives to false positives to also be matched across groups. In contrast, the
technical metric "equal opportunity" (not to be confused with the legal notion of
equality of opportunity discussed above) only requires the first of these
constraints: the ratio of true positive to false negative decisions needs to be the
same across groups.
This definition in terms of error rate inextricably links bias preserving
metrics to the use of "ground-truth" labels. For example, while we can say if a
deployed algorithm exhibits (conditional) demographic parity, without
generating new ground-truth labels for the data coming in we cannot say whether
it satisfies equalized odds, only that it did so on previous training or validation
data. This dependence on ground-truth data for evaluation makes it particularly
difficult to say whether a system satisfies a bias preserving fairness metric if
distribution shift occurs between training the system and its deployment.
Generating ground-truth data at deployment for people that have
received negative decisions is practically challenging. It is highly unlikely, for
example, that banks would regularly give loans to applicants that fail their risk

Matt J. Kusner, Joshua Loftus, Chris Russell & Ricardo Silva, Counterfactual Fairness
130
(Mar. 8, 2018) (Conference paper, NIPS 2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.06856.pdf; Niki
Kilbertus, Mateo Rojas-Carulla, Giambattista Parascandolo, Moritz Hardt et al., Avoiding
Discrimination through Causal Reasoning (Jan. 21, 2018) (Conference paper, NIPS 2017),

https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.02744.pdf; Silvia Chiappa & Thomas P. S. Gillam, Path-Specific
Counterfactual Fairness (Feb. 22, 2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.08139.pdf.

13'

Chiappa & Gillam, supra note 130.
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assessment solely for the sake of creating the data necessary to know whether
their decisions satisfy equalized odds, or are formally fair in practice. Data does
not exist for the counterfactual needed to assess whether a rejected job or a loan
applicant would have been successful in the event of a positive decision. 3 As a
result, social "randomised control trials," where positive outcomes are assigned
to random applicants, would often be the only way to determine whether a
deployed system truly satisfies bias preserving metrics.
In the field of machine learning it is common in practice to train a
machine learning system on proxy variables that are easier to measure than the
variables we want the system to predict. For example, a system may be trained
to predict if an individual has a high credit score as a proxy for if they will repay
a loan, or a system may be trained to predict if an individual will be arrested as
a proxy for if they will break the law. This mismatch between what we want to
predict and the proxy variables we can actually observe is another way for
systematic bias to enter systems. 133 Inheriting social bias in this way cannot be
detected by naive use of bias preserving metrics that simply measure whether the
machine learning system recovers values of the proxy variables with similar
errors for each groups.
Bias transforming metrics for algorithmic fairness can of course also be
problematic. Such metrics require an explicit decision as to what biases a system
should exhibit, and these decisions can interact with existing social biases in nonobvious ways. For example, blindly enforcing demographic parity when
deciding who should receive a loan could result in loans being offered to
individuals that are unable to repay the loans due to existing social biases
resulting in lower salaries. In turn this could lead to more individuals in
disadvantaged groups going bankrupt, and worsening social inequality. Further,
the chosen conditions can also be highly political and normatively laden.
Developers may purposefully choose favorable variables to condition on.
Nonetheless these choices would-if published alongside summary statistics
(which we have advocate for elsewhere)-be transparent and open to inspection
and debate by affected parties and regulators.1 3 4

132

Mitchell et al., supra note 30, at 4.

&

13
Proxies can reflect different historical biases and institutional inequality than typically
associated with the intended prediction variables. For example, assessing a student's potential
based on standardised testing scores carries latent bias caused by disparity in access to education
and support services (e.g., external tutoring). With regards to Roma and the EU, see D.H. v. Czech
Republic, 2007-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 241, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-83256. Standardised
testing has a negative effect on children (i.e., being placed in special schools) and can significantly
impact a particular minority if the class is composed of 50-90% Roma children. This is seen as
discriminatory due to Roma people only making up 2% of the general population. For more details,
see CHOPIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 13-18; FISCHER ET AL., supra note 14, at 172-73 With regards
to the United States and Black and Latin people and immigrants, see HALLEY, ESHLEMAN,
VIJAYA, supra note 12, at 40, 120-21, 127, 136.
134

Wachter et al., supra note 34, at 62-64; see supra Section III.B.
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Returning to non-discrimination law, the need to justify measures that
cause significant disparity draws attention to the importance of choosing the right
fairness metric in a given decision-making context. Choice of metric of course
matters less for diagnostic, debugging, and investigatory purposes. However,
when used as a basis to actually make fair (automated) decisions in practice,
choice of fairness metric is of critical normative importance. Choosing an
appropriate metric should be subject to significantly more explicit consideration
and justification than is currently the case in work on fair machine learning.
Our proposed classification of metrics according to bias preservation is
intended to help evaluate possible metrics and choose between them.
Justification as required by EU non-discrimination law provides an ideal model
to evaluate the acceptability of fairness metrics at a sectoral and local
deployment level. In the following sections we explore the relative merit and
possible justification of bias preserving and transforming metrics in relation to
substantive equality.
IV. THE STATUS QUO IS NOT NEUTRAL
Algorithmic decision-making can only be neutral in a normative sense
if we are satisfied with how decisions have been made in the past. Specific
actions are not required to inherit and reinforce the biases of past decisionmaking. If we were solely transposing good or equitable human decision-making
processes to automated systems, we would only need to worry about technical
bias. This is, unfortunately, typically not the case.
Recognizing this, bias preserving fairness metrics are potentially
problematic on several grounds. Many of their limitations can be traced back to
their treatment of the status quo as a neutral starting point to assess fairness in
machine learning. These metrics do not differentiate between reasons for past
inequality; rather, only the replication of historic performance with comparable
error rates for each group matters. Simply matching these error rates is
considered "fair."As a result, they ignore underlying causes of social biases and
inequalities in a given decision-making context.1 35 In contrast, bias transforming
metrics require a positive normative choice to be made about which biases
should be exhibited by a decision-making system. In forcing this choice, any
recognised instance of disparity between groups may be seen as potentially
36
discriminatory and in need of legal justification.
By design, bias preserving metrics run the risk of "freezing" or locking
in social injustices and discriminatory effects, which does not align well with the
core aim of EU non-discrimination law: to achieve substantive equality. Ignoring

135
HALLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 120-21, 127, 136. Racist hiring practices, for example,
may be indistinguishable from inequality rooted in broader societal factors, such as people of color

having fewer educational opportunities and thus being less competitive in the job market.

136

Supra Section

IlI.B.
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the reasons behind inequality is problematic from the view of substantive
equality because understanding why decisions were made historically is crucial
to correct the inequalities they created.
In Western society, the status quo is not acceptable for large parts of the
population. The way we make decisions is often marked by prejudice and
inequality.13 7 Historical trends in decision-making have led to diminished and
unequal access to opportunities and outcomes among certain groups.1 38 It is in
this sense that the status quo is not neutral. Maintaining it by treating it as a
neutral baseline for comparison cannot therefore be considered a politically,
ethically, or legally neutral act.
Individual and institutional prejudice are ingrained in many countries.1 39
Racial inequality in top jobs is particularly pronounced in the United States and

137

Evidence cited in this section provides a small glimpse of the vast structural racism, sexism,

ableism, heterosexism and other bigotries embedded in the data we collect and use to train
decision-making algorithms. The brief overview provided here cannot possibly be comprehensive,
and cannot do justice to all disparities in the world. Many other scholars have done the groundbreaking work necessary to understand discrimination, prejudice, and inequality as found in the
21st century. Rather, what follows is merely a sample of this inequality, focusing in particular on
statistics and stories that reveal the significant disparity to be found in historical data and the status
quo. Given the regulatory frameworks discussed in this work, and reflecting the frequent
comparisons in literature on Al policy and regulation, we focus on evidence from the United States,

UK, and EU. All categories and labels used for different demographic categories reflect those used
in the primary sources cited.

See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIs, WOMEN, RACE, AND CLASS (1983).
139
In the UK, for example, significant proportions of the UK population have readily admitted
to holding racist views, including a significant group comprised of highly educated and affluent
13

white professionals between the ages of 35 and 44. See EDDO-LODGE, supra note 15, at 65, 190,
205; 30 Years of British Social Attitudes Self-Reported Racial Prejudice Data, NATCEN Soc.
RsCH.,
https://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/38110/selfreported-racial-prejudice-datafinal.pdf
(last visited Feb. 28, 2021); Matthew Taylor & Hugh Muir, Racism on the Rise in Britain, THE
GUARDIAN (May 27, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/may/27/-sp-racism-on-

rise-in-britain. Signs of institutional racism can also be found in self-reported attitudes; statistics
from 2014, for example, revealed that "[c]oncern about immigrants as a drain on public service
resources rises significantly with income, while job-related concern declines as income rises." See
Duffy Bobby & Tom Frere-Smith, PerceptionsandReality: Public Attitudes to Immigration, IPsos

MORI Soc. RscH. INST., at 56 (2014).
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4
United Kingdom. 140 People of color can be treated worse in interviews,1 ' can be
less associated with higher paid occupations, can appear less qualified than their
white counterparts with the same qualifications,1 4 2 and can receive lower wages
on average.' 43
Women and gender non-binary people face similar challenges in the job
14 4
Female associated jobs pay less on average and are seen as less
market.

Statistics from 2019 from the United States reveal 88.8% of chief executives are white,
while only 4.1% are Black, 5.8% are Asian, and 6.2% are Hispanic. See Employed Persons by
Detailed Occupation, Sex, Race, and Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaatl l.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2021). Similar worrying
trends are seen in areas of general and operational management, advertising and promotion
managers, sales and marketing managers, financial managers, and industrial production managers,
where the vast majority (between 80 and 90%) of positions are filled by White people. In the UK,
140

the situation is slightly better. A survey from 2018 shows roughly 11% of Indian, Asian, and White
people are managers, directors, or senior officials. However, only 5% of Black people occupy these
high-level roles. See Employment by Occupation, GOv'T UK (Nov. 9, 2020),
https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/work-pay-andbenefits/employment/employment-by-occupation/latest. "Elementary" jobs-the lowest skilled
category of occupation recorded in the survey-was highest in the Black (16%) and Other White

(15%) ethnic groups.
See Carl O. Word, Mark P. Zanna & Joel Cooper, The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-fulfilling
141
Prophecies in InterracialInteraction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 109 (1974) (demonstrating
how interviewers treat Black people differently than White people. For example, interviewers sat
further away from Black candidates, spoke with more errors, were more unfriendly and ended the
interview more quickly than for White candidates. When the same interviewing patterns were
applied to White people, the performance declined and the White candidates were more nervous.);
see also HALLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 155-56.
142
HALLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 153.
143
In-group differences also exist. In the United States, lighter-skinned African-American men
receive roughly the same wages as White men, whereas medium and dark-skinned AfricanAmerican men do not. Arthur H. Goldsmith, Darrick Hamilton & William Darity, From Dark to
Light: Skin Color and Wages Among African-Americans, 42 J. HUM. RES. 701 (2007).
144
For a discussion on gender bias, Al, and the workplace, see Maria De-Arteaga, Alexey
Romanov, Hanna Wallach, Jennifer Chayes et al., Bias in Bios: A Case Study of Semantic
RepresentationBias in a High-stakes Setting, in 2019 PROCEEDINGS OF CONFRENCE ON FAIRNESS,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 120 (2020). Society and institutions including schools and
universities, politics, and the workplace have historically been built on a social expectation of
heteronormativity. See JEAN HALLEY & AMY ESHLEMAN, SEEING STRAIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO
GENDER AND SEXUAL PRIVILEGE 32-33 (2016); Andras Tilcsik, Prideand Prejudice:Employment

DiscriminationAgainst Openly Gay Men in the United States, 117 AM. J. SOCIO. 586 (2011).
People identifying as LGBTQ, or not conforming with binary standards of heteronormativity, are
afforded little legal protection across the world and routinely face severe inequality, harassment,
discrimination, and violence. See Alex Hanna, Being Transgender on the Job Market, INSIDE

HIGHER ED. (July 15, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2016/07/15/challenge-beingtransgender-academic-job-market-essay. A 2014 U.S. report showed that one out of two
transgender individuals are sexually assaulted or abused at some point in their lives. See
Responding to Transgender Victims of Sexual Assault, OFF. OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (June 2014),
https://ove.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh226/files/pubs/forge/sexualnumbers.html.
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important than male associated jobs.1 45 Decisions about promotions and hiring
are likewise prone to gender bias,1 46 with women routinely rated as less
competent than male colleagues despite comparable performance.1 47 In the
United States in 2019 only 27.6% of chief executives were women.1 48 Physical
appearance can also influence employer's assessment of the talent and
professionalism of employees and applicants. 14 9
Social stigma around disability also manifests in workplace
inequality. 50 People with physical, psychosocial, intellectual, and sensory
conditions routinely face significant challenges, biases, and inequalities in the
workplace,15 1 including a lack of employment, promotion, mentorship, and
significantly higher likelihood of dismissal. 52 Mental conditions in particular are
viewed more severely than physical conditions.153 Ableist assumptions result in

"45
A study from the United States showed that as more women take up particular jobs the
sector's perceived prestigiousness and average wages decline. See PEREZ, supra note 17. Women
also face greater difficulty when negotiating remuneration due to not being seen as "likeable" in

negotiations. See Hannah R. Bowles, Linda Babcock, Lei Lai, Social Incentives for Gender
Differences in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes It Does Hurt To Ask, 103

84 (2007). Service jobs such as
teaching, counselling, nursing, or childcare, which are often associated with women, tend to pay
less than other occupations with similar requirements. See Paula England, Michelle Budig
&

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES

Nancy Folbre, Wages of Virtue: The Relative Pay of Care Work, 49 SOC. PROBS. 455 (2002); see
also HALLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 160-61.

146

O'NEIL, supra note 20, at 106-22. Criteria that seem prima facie neutral, such as

consecutive years of employment, are in reality sexist as they punish career disruptions commonly
experienced by women (e.g., caring duties).
147

For example, in a U.S. study faculty assessors (both male and female) ranked female

competence lower for a laboratory manager position and offered lower starting salaries even
though identical resumes were sent in but some had male and some had female names. See Corinne
A. Moss-Racusin, John F. Dovidio, Victoria L. Brecoll, Mark J. Graham et al., Science Faculty's
Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students, 109 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 16474 (2012); see also
SAINI, supra note 13, at 5.
48
Employed Persons by Detailed Occupation, Sex, Race, and Hispanic or Latino
Ethnicity,
supra note 140.
149
For example, a study shows that women who wear their hair in braids at work (which is
common for women from India and African-Americans) are more likely to be seen as
unprofessional in some workplaces. See HALLEY ET AL., supranote 12, at 150-51.
150
For example, Harpur argues that people with disability are often seen as ugly, in need of
"curing" (including eugenics), and are encountered with charity and pity. PAUL DAVID HARPUR,
ABLEISM AT WORK 7 (2019). For an overview of the cause of this stigma, see MICHELLE R. NARIOREDMOND, ABLEISM (2019).
151

HARPUR, supra note 150, at 5-6.

Id. at 9-12. Having a disability makes an adult 75-89% more likely to be fired. The
likelihood of securing a job is reduced by 40% for adults with physical disabilities and even worse
152

for those with mental disabilities. See RICHARD BERTHOUD, THE EMPLOYMENT RATES OF DISABLED
PEOPLE 298 (2006).
153
HARPUR, supra note 150, at 2, 14-15.
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perfectly capable workers being disfavored and disadvantaged. Algorithms
satisfying bias preserving metrics can transport these ableist assumptions into
future decision-making. 54
Criminal justice is likewise heavily impacted by racial bigotry, with
people of color significantly more likely to be stopped and searched, arrested,
56
5 5
and receive harsher punishments than others in the United States' and UK.1
Lending decisions are also plagued with racial bias;' race-based "redlining" of
postal codes, for example, is still practiced in 2020158 despite being illegal in
many countries. 59 Healthcare is another troubling area. Participant samples in
6
clinical trials and health studies are routinely biased towards white males.

On ideas on how to counter Al bias in the realm of disabilities, see Anhong Guo, Ece Kamar,
15
Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Hanna Wallach et al., Toward Fairness in AI for People with

Disabilities: A Research Roadmap (Aug. 2, 2019) (Position paper, ACM ASSETS 2019),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.02227.pdf; Os Keyes, Automating Autism: Disability, Discourse, and
Artificial Intelligence, I J. SOCIOTECHNICAL CRITIQUE 1 (2020).
155
In the United States, African-American people spend on average the same amount in prison
for drugs as White people do for violent crimes. African-Americans are incarcerated at a rate eight

times higher than that of Whites. In 2009, the majority (70%) of prisoners in the United States
were African-American or Latino as opposed to the 1950s, when segregation was still legal, and
around 30% of the African-American population was imprisoned. See David Cole, Can Our
2009),
19,
UNIv. L. CTR. (Nov.
GEO.
Reformed?,
Shameful
Prisons be
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1378&context=facpub.
156
Reports from the UK in 2020 show that Black/BAME people are several times more likely
to be stopped and searched (9x / 4x) or arrested (3x / 1.5x) than White people. See Vikram Dodd,
Black People Nine Times More Likely to Face Stop and Search Than White People, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 27, 2020), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/oct/27/black-people-nine-times-

more-likely-to-face-stop-and-search-than-white-people. Similar inequality can be found for drugrelated arrests and sentencing. See The Numbers in Black and White: Ethnic Disparities in The

Policing and Prosecution of Drug Offences

in

England and

Wales,

RELEASE,

https://www.release.org.uk/publications/numbers-black-and-white-ethnic-disparities-policing-

and-prosecution-drug-offences (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
For example, in the United States African-Americans, Latinx, and immigrants are the main
57
targets for predatory lenders which contributed to the 2008 housing crisis. See STIGLITZ, supra
note 7, at 88.
58
Patrick Rucker, Trump FinancialRegulator Quietly Shelved DiscriminationProbes into
Bank of America and Other Lenders, PROPUBLICA, https://www.propublica.org/article/trumpfinancial-regulator-quietly-shelved-discrimination-probes-into-bank-of-america-and-other-

lenders?token=nD-X136_tDmOnhll4XtvOLbpjYBSO3u (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
159
In Germany for example, it would have been illegal to solely use postcodes for lending
decisions. See Wachter & Mittelstadt, supra note 7, at 589-90. For U.S. history on the topic, see
Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, Redlining, and the Discriminatory Access to Loans, Credit, and
Insurance:An Historical and EmpiricalAnalysis of Consumers Who Sued Lenders and Insurers
in Federal and State Courts, 1950-1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 583 (1996); see also HALLEY ET
AL.,

supra note 12, at 110.

160

&

PEREZ, supra note 17, at 115-16. On how to address bias in the medical setting, see Timo
Minssen, Sara Gerke, Mateo Aboy, Nicholson Price et al., Regulatory Responses to Medical
Machine Learning, J.L. & BIOSCIENCES, APR. 11, 2020, at 18, and Mirjam Pot, Wanda Spahl
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Medical interventions and metrics often fail to account for biological differences
between populations,"'1 for example by treating women simply as "little men"
despite health conditions often presenting differently in men and women. 16 2 The
existence of "neutral" health data concerning sexual identity is particularly
difficult to imagine given the clinical designation of "homosexuality" as a mental
illness until the 1970s. Likewise, being transgender was formally classified as a
type of identity disorder until 2012.163
Certain people thus face systematic disadvantages in the workplace,
lending, education, criminal justice, health, insurance, and other areas. This is
morally and legally problematic. Merit alone is often insufficient for individuals
to succeed compared to their peers. 164 Treating the status quo as neutral does not
sufficiently acknowledge this social reality. In other words, by merely seeking
to preserve per-group error rates, bias preserving methods implicitly
overestimate the role of meritocracy. 165 This can be problematic; in Western
societies, factors such as inheritance, luck, unequal opportunity, and
discrimination are just as important to success as merit.166 For example, the best

Barbara Prainsack, The Gender of Biomedical Data: Challengesfor Personalisedand Precision
Medicine, 9 SOMATECHNICS 170 (2019).
161
PEREZ, supra note 17, at 116. One of the reasons why this is not done is because it is more

complex (e.g., fluctuating hormone levels during the menstrual cycle), risky (e.g., female
participants could be pregnant), and time and resource intensive to study women. SAINI, supra note

13, at 58.
162
Women differ for example in percentage of body fat, skin thickness, hormone levels and
compositions, changing hormone levels throughout the menstrual cycle, and changing hormone
levels prior to puberty and after menopause. Each of these factors affect how well drugs work or
how much we are affected by toxins or environmental impacts. See PEREZ, supra note 17, at 116;
SAINI, supra note 13, at 59, 62.
163
HALLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 58. Specifically, until the 1970s the Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM") classified "homosexuality" as a mental illness.
Id.
1"
STEPHEN J. MCNAMEE & ROBERT K. MILLER, THE MERITOCRACY MYTH 243 (2009).
165
Judith Butler refers to it as the bootstrapping argument. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:
FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (2011). According to the myth, a system can be
considered fair if all people have the same opportunities to succeed (i.e., formal equality, equality
of treatment). Success or failure rests solely on the merit of the individual. The possibility of
institutional inequality disadvantaging certain (groups of) people is discounted. Id.
166
Specifically, meritocracy is a myth because "of the combined effects of non-merit factors
such as inheritance, social and cultural advantages, unequal educational opportunity, luck and the

changing structure of job opportunities, the decline of self-employment, and discrimination in all
of its forms." Stephen J. McNamee & Robert K. Miller, Jr., The Meritocracy Myth, SOCIATION
TODAY, http://www.ncsociology.org/sociationtoday/v21/merit.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).

Also, evidence from the 2011 Economic Mobility Project shows a strong link between parental
education and children's economic, educational, and socio-motional outcomes in many countries,
and most strongly in the United States. Does America Promote Mobility As Well As Other
Nations?,
ECON.
MOBILITY
PROJECT,
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-

/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcsassets/2011/critafinallpdf.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2021). In
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predictor for whether a person will be in poverty as an adult is whether they were
born into poverty.' 67
Of course, non-discrimination law has helped to remedy the effects of
many social biases and inequalities. In certain areas such as the workplace or
when offering goods and services (both of which increasingly face greater
deployment of AI and automated decision-making), the law protects certain
groups (e.g., gender, race, sexual orientation, disability) from direct
discrimination and indirect discrimination. 68
Unfortunately, changes in law do not equate directly to changes in
mindsets. Many racist and sexist practices historically seen as "justified" still
remain in practice and legacy. Granting women access to managerial jobs, for
example, does not fix inequality in employment overnight; rather, substantive
equality is only possible at a societal level when fair practices and rules have
been in place for multiple generations.' 69
The data we use to train models and make automated decisions carries
the legacy of our unequal past and present. By treating the status quo as neutral,
bias preserving metrics miss out on the opportunity to shed light on, and begin

general and citing this work, see STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 22. The countries surveyed were the
United States, UK, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Australia, Finland, Denmark, and Canada. Id.
EUBANKS, supra note 20, at 205. In the United States, for example, 40% of children from
167
the poorest income group remain poor. Those who move up tend to only move up a little as adults,
whereas individuals born into the highest income group tend to remain there. See Markus Jantti,
American Exceptionalism in a New Light: A Comparison of IntergenerationalEarnings Mobility
in the Nordic Countries, the United Kingdom and the United States 17 (Jan. 2006),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/33604/1/513429301.pdf. In Nordic countries, on the
other hand, only 20% remain in the poorest group as adults, 30% in the U.K. See HALLEY ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 106; STIGLrrZ, supra note 7, at 23. Similarly, "differences in initial conditions as
of a real-life age of 23 account for more of the variation in realized lifetime earnings, lifetime
wealth, and lifetime utility than do shocks over the working lifetime." Mark Huggett, Gustavo
Ventura & Amir Yaron, Sources of Lifetime Inequality, 101 AM. ECON. REv. 2923, 2949 (2011).
See also Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Consequences of Inequality in the United States, 12
SPEECH AT THE CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 3 (2012) (explaining "[t]he chance of a person who was
born to a family in the bottom 10% of the income distribution rising to the top 10% as an adult is
about the same as the chance that a dad who is 5'6" tall having a son who grows up to be over 6' 1"
tall. It happens, but not often"). Similarly, poor children who succeed academically have been

found to be less likely to graduate from college than richer children who did worse in school and
tend to remain worse off comparatively. Id. See also STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 24; Jonathan Chait,
The Ideological Fantasies of Inequality Deniers, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 26, 2011),
Further, a 2020
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2011/10/theideological_fantasiesof_i.html.
OECD study on social mobility shows that it takes six generations in Germany to move from the
lowest income bracket to an average salary, five generations for the United States, Switzerland,
Austria, and at least three generations in the Finland and Sweden. See Schneller Schlau, Wenn die
Eltern nicht studiert haben, WIRTSCHAFT, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/schnellerschlau/sozialer-aufstieg-wenn-die-eltern-nicht-studiert-haben-16960036.html (last visited Feb. 28,

2021).
168

Wachter, Affinity Profiling, supra note 42; Wachter et al., supra note 34.

169

See supra Part II.
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to address, the systemic causes of inequality. To combat systemic inequality and
achieve substantive equality, private and public actors must play an active
role.1 0 In this context, choosing to preserve the status quo must be treated as an
explicit normative decision that deems the status quo acceptable. 71 If this choice
occurs in sectors known to be marked by injustice, it can potentially be seen as
conflicting with the substantive aims of the law. Such a choice raises prima facie
discrimination and ought to be justified.
To assess and potentially justify prima facie discrimination in fair
machine learning, it is essential to recognise the diverse manifestation of
inequalities that occur globally. Gender and racial discrimination and other
issues of bigotry in the United States and the Member States of the EU will
manifest differently according to the cultural and historical legacies of individual
countries. One type of inequality cannot be easily be assumed to also occur in a
different environment. What we have coined "contextual equality" must factor
into the choice and justification of fairness metrics and inherited biases in
machine learning and Al.1 72
V. TOWARDS SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY IN FAIR MACHINE LEARNING

As demonstrated above, the status quo is marked by significant implicit
and explicit bias and inequality. Using past decisions as a basis for future
automated decisions means past biases can easily be inherited by a trained
model.1 73
Returning to the context of indirect discrimination occuring in our
hypothetical scenario in court,1'74 we argue that using bias preserving metrics in
contexts where unjustified bias and inequality have existed historically can give
rise to prima facie discrimination. As mentioned above,'
under normal
circumstances a claimant would need to provide evidence to convince the court
that prima facie discrimination exists by way of showing that an "apparently
neutral provision, criterion or practice" disproportionately disadvantages a
protected group in comparison with other people.

170

See supra Section I1.C.

171

EUBANKS,

supra note 20; O'NErL, supra note 20.

172
Elsewhere, we have coined the term "contextual equality" to describe the contextual
application of non-discrimination law by the judiciary in the EU. Examination of relevant
jurisprudence reveals that fairness and discrimination are fluid concepts that are given meaning on
a case-by-casis basis. For the argument for contextual equality in full, and its significance for fair
machine learning, see Wachter et al., supra note 34.

173
The only case in which bias is not inherited is a hypothetical utopia in which past decisions
are perfectly fair or in which all people receive the minimal possible outcome ("levelling down").
174
175

See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section II.A.
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By definition, high accuracy models trained on historical data to satisfy
a bias preserving metric will often replicate the bias present in their training data.
This feature makes the hypothetical claimant's task of establishing prima facie
discrimination simpler. The claimant will not need to gather substantial evidence
demonstrating the disparate nature of the contested "provision, criterion or
practice" itself. Rather, the claimant need only show that significant disparity or
bias has historically existed in the decision-making context (e.g., in employment)
to prove that the contested "provision, criterion or practice" (e.g., an automated
76
decision-making model trained with a bias preserving metric' ) is prima facie
discriminatory.
Once prima facie discrimination has been established, the burden of
proof shifts to the alleged offender (e.g., the actor using an automated decisionmaking system) who then must justify the contested "provision, criterion or
practice" under the proportionality test citing a legitimate interested. Contested
measures can be justified if there is a legitimate interest, and the means to achieve
it are necessary and proportionate.1 77 Given the ease of establishing prima facie
discrimination, using bias preserving metrics as a basis for automated decisionmaking should be accompanied by consideration of possible justifications far in
advance of actual litigation.
But a key challenge remains for justifying bias preserving metrics for
decision-making purposes. The proportionality test states that for a contested
rule or practice to be classified as "necessary," there must be no other less
infringing means to achieve the interest in question. Bias transforming metrics
can be seen as "less infringing means" because they are better suited to
promoting substantive equality. Specifically, unlike bias preserving metrics, they
give the decision-maker a choice of the properties a classifier should exhibit.
They do so through the choice of conditioning variable(s) for conditional
78
In doing
independence or the choice of metric for fairness through awareness.
for
basis
as
the
selected
to
be
metric
biased
or
intrusive
a
less
so, they allow for
preserving
bias
of
usage
justify
to
decisions. As a result, arguments offered
metrics might fail because they may not be considered "necessary" in a legal
sense unless it can be shown that conditioning on the target variable is the least
intrusive possible means of achieving a legitimate interest.179

176 Note that typical machine learning systems trained without any form of fairness constraint
also look to replicate the past decisions made on historic data with high fidelity, and the same
argument can be made regarding them.
177
For an overview of the ECJ's case law on legally accepted justifications, see Wachter, Data
Protection,supra note 3, at 46-54; Wachter et al., supra note 34, at 534-37.
Cynthia Dwork, Mortiz Hardt, Toniann Pitassi, Omer Reingold et al., Fairness Through
178
Awareness (Nov. 30, 2011), https://arxiv.org/pdf/ 104.3913.pdf.

179

Justification would only be possible if the alleged offender could show that bias preserving

metrics are less infringing in a legal sense than bias transforming metrics. It is difficult to imagine
a scenario in the context of EU non-discrimination law where this would be the case;

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2021

41

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 123, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 4
776

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123

This is not to suggest that using bias transforming metrics in automated
decision-making will eliminate historical biases or prevent future disparity
altogether. Their usage likewise does not establish a legal duty to dismantle
inequality.1 80 They cannot force decision-makers to change their behaviors or
criteria. The same requirements apply to contested practices using these metrics;
any disparity found must still be justified as necessary, proportionate, and in
pursuit of a legitimate interest.
Bias transforming metrics are not a "silver bullet" to solve algorithmic
discrimination. Rather, their value comes from their explicit requirement that
users must make a normative judgement of what bias is acceptable in a given use
case.' 81 This is, of course, a politically, legally, and ethically significant decision
in itself. Nonetheless, bias transforming metrics force designers and decisionmakers to confront fairness and to consider the biases and inequalities in their
data that would otherwise be ignored, hidden, or treated as justified by bias
preserving metrics.1 82
When viewed as a tool to confront past disparity, bias transforming
metrics have two clear benefits. First, in the context of litigation, bias
transforming metrics force otherwise ignored inequalities into the conversation.
Decision-makers must then explain why the disparity is justified, or why it
should be ignored. Open and transparent discussion of the justifiability of
disparity in this manner is essential to promote substantive equality. Second,
discussing disparity and the relative intrusiveness of possible fairness metrics
creates an opportunity. It gives decision-makers or developers of automated
systems a chance to tweak the decision-making process and criteria to level the
playing field for disadvantaged groups, unless a legal justification for the
disparity can be demonstrated. When used correctly, bias transforming metrics
help ensure inequality in automated decision-making is explicitly acknowledged,
discussed, and potentially justified in a consistent and realistic manner. This type
of critical self-reflection and foresight is essential if users of Al, machine
learning, and automated decision-making in the public and private sectors are to
play a more active role in dismantling inequality.' 83

hypothetically, formal equality may be valued higher in certain decision-making contexts in which
case bias preserving metrics could be considered necessary.
See supra Section I.C.
For example, in the case of conditional independence, the choice of bias is made by
choosing which variable(s) to condition on.
182
Certain bias transforming metrics can, when coupled with summary statistics, help identify
hidden inequalities by treating all groups as equal and report on differences in outcomes between
them. See infra Section VI.B.
180
181

183

For a discussion of effective usage of bias transforming metrics, specifically Conditional
Demographic Disparity, see Wachter et al., supra note 34, at 547.
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While the existence and precise requirements of positive duties remains
debated,' 84 critically investigating historical bias in this manner can only benefit
designers and users of automated decision-making. In EU non-discrimination
185
In
law, intent is not necessary to establish direct or indirect discrimination.
as
procedures
practice, this means decision-makers have an interest to test their
thoroughly as possible because they can be held liable for disparity
independently of their prior knowledge. A lack of intent is not an effective
justification in court. In fact, even well-intentioned actions can be seen as
discriminatory. 186 This again means careful thought needs to occur before bias
preserving metrics are deployed as decision-making criteria where an obligation
to promote substantive equality exists.' 87
For all these reasons, unquestioning use of bias preserving metrics in
automated decision-making is therefore inadvisable in places governed by nondiscrimination law and related legal frameworks that aim at substantive equality,
such as the UK and EU. To actively move towards substantive equality in fair
machine learning, we recommend usage of bias transforming metrics for
purposes of decision-making.
With that said, bias preserving metrics still have a role to play in fair
machine learning. In legal contexts that pursue formal rather than substantive
equality, or for use cases where existing biases are normatively acceptable, bias
preserving metrics may be preferable. For purely diagnostic and testing purposes
(i.e., not decision-making), both bias preserving and transforming metrics are
broadly acceptable. Ideally, users should test as broadly as possible with both
bias preserving and transforming metrics to investigate the fairness of their
decision-making systems.

184

See supra Section I.C.

185

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS. AND COUNCIL OF EUR., HANDBOOK ON

EUROPEAN

NON-DISCRIMINATION

https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra
186 Id at 240.

LAW

239

(2018

ed.),

uploads/1510-fra-case-law-handbook en.pdf.

187 See supra Section II.C. In American non-discrimination law, intent is relevant to establish
whether disparate treatment (direct discrimination) has occurred. Testing for discrimination plays
a different role in this context, as it can potentially reveal previously unknown inequality to the
decision-maker. Failure to act to correct this inequality could then potentially be seen as evidence
of intent to commit discrimination. Investigating the connection between fairness testing and intent
is an interesting future question for work on UK, EU, and U.S. non-discrimination law and
automated decision-making. For more details on these doctrines, see Nachbar, supra note 65, at
23-24. See also id. at 51, 55 (explaining that if knowledge of the discriminatory nature of a
"facially neutral" practice exists, it could turn disparate impact into (intentional) disparate
treatment).
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As a field, fair machine learning is predominantly driven by statistical
measures of fairness and fixes that address "technical bias." This approach
ignores important, explicit normative decisions about how a system should
behave and risks leaving important legal, ethical, and political decisions solely
to developers, deployers, and users. These decisions determine what is fair and
discriminatory, whether a "particular disadvantage" was severe enough to
warrant discussion, and ultimately whether indirect discrimination can be

justified.188
In this Article we introduced a new classification scheme for fairness
metrics to clarify the lines of debate and make clear the normative and political
dimensions of technical work on fair machine learning. Put simply, developers
have a choice between two types of metrics: (1) "bias preserving" metrics that
take society as it currently exists as a neutral starting point or "level playing
field" from which we can measure inequality and bias in machine learning; and
(2) "bias transforming" metrics that acknowledge historical inequalities and start
from the assumption that certain groups will have a worse starting point than
others.
While technical fixes alone cannot solve the root causes of societal
inequalities, our choice of fairness metric can ensure machine learning
applications do not exacerbate existing inequalities and fully acknowledge the
extent and significance of existing inequalities. The choice of variables to
condition on for fairness tests, thresholds for illegal disparity, and acceptable
arguments to justify disparity are difficult political determinations.
Ultimately, these determinations will be made by a court, subsequent
case law, and potentially even new laws. However, using bias transforming
metrics draws further attention to these important determinations and helps
ensure they are made in the open involving democratically legitimised courts and
legislatures. To advance the adoption of bias transforming metrics in practice,
we conclude with several practical and policy recommendations and open
questions for future research.
A.

A Checklistfor ChoosingAppropriate FairnessMetrics

We have argued that bias preserving metrics in decision making can give
raise to prima facie indirect discrimination under EU non-discrimination law.' 89
Developers should proactively justify the potentially discriminatory effect of
their "provision, criterion or practice" under indirect discrimination doctrine by
providing an objective justification under the proportionality test (i.e., a

188
189

For more detail, see Wachter, Data Protection,supra note 3; Wachter et al., supra note 34.
See supra Part V.
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'

90
legitimate interest that is pursued in a necessary and proportionate manner).'
This need for legal justification reflects our observation that the usage of fairness
metrics is not a neutral choice. It is an explicit normative decision, and must be
treated as such.
To assist in this process of choosing appropriate fairness metrics for both
diagnostic and decision-making purposes in machine learning, Figure 1 presents
a checklist reflecting the contributions and recommendations made throughout
this Article. This simple checklist is intended for use by developers, deployers,
and other users of Al, ML, and automated decision-making systems.
Question 1 reflects the distinction between using fairness metrics to test
for and diagnose disparity, and to make fair decisions in practice. Both bias
9
preserving and transforming metrics are valuable for diagnostic purposes.1
Substantive decisions are those with impact on individuals falling within the
remit of non-discrimination law.

190

For an overview of the ECJ's case law on legally accepted justifications, see Wachter, Data

Protection,supra note 3, at 46-54; Wachter et al., supra note 34, at 534-37.
191
See supra Section III.C.
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Question 2 addresses the need for justification when using bias
preserving metrics to make substantive decisions in contexts historically marked
by inequality. Inequality is widespread in society.1 92 Following
recommendations from legal scholars, we advise developers, deployers, and
users to reverse the burden of proof by taking for granted the existence of
inequality unless explicitly disproven or justified. Question 2 should therefore
only be answered in the negative where historical inequality can be shown not to
exist in the given decision-making context, or existing inequality has already

Figure 1: Bias preservation checklist

Q1: Are you using fairness metrics to solely diagnose
disparity, but are not making substantive decisions about
individuals?
Yes: Both bias preserving and transforming metrics can be

used.
No: Go to Question 2.

Q2: Are you deploying a system to make decisions in an area
known to have unacceptable historical social inequality?
Yes: Go to Question 3.

No: Recommend investigation of possible bias in use case
before choosing a metric.

Q3: Are you deploying the system and in a legal jurisdiction
that solely promotes formal equality?
Yes: Both bias preserving and transforming metrics can be
used.

No: Go to Question 4.

Q4: Are you deploying the system and in a legal jurisdiction
that promotes substantive equality?
Yes: Recommend using a bias transforming metric.
No: Both bias preserving and transforming metrics can be
used.

192

See supra Part IV.
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been deemed legally justified through litigation. If this proves to be the case both
bias preserving and transforming metrics can be used.
Questions 3 and 4 distinguish between use cases according to the type
of legal framework in place, specifically between those that strictly pursue
93
The legal
formal equality, and those aiming at substantive equality.'
acceptability of fairness metrics varies according to the emphasis local legal
frameworks place on formal or substantive equality. Bias transforming metrics
are best placed for (automated) decision-making aimed at substantive equality.
If Question 3 is answered in the affirmative, meaning a system is being used
within a framework solely aiming at formal equality, both bias preserving and
transforming metrics can be used to pursue this aim.
In contrast, if Question 4 is answered in the affirmative, meaning the
framework at hand aims at substantive equality, we recommend usage of only
bias transforming metrics for decision-making purposes in automated systems.
This recommendation follows the capacity of bias transforming metrics to
facilitate dialogue around the existence and justifiability of social bias and
inequality, and to give developers, deployers, and users a choice of the bias the
system should exhibit. This choice of, for example, variables to condition on (in
the case of conditional independence) creates a clear path to open dialogue about
the legal acceptability of existing disparity.
Bias preserving metrics are less well-suited to this purpose but can, of
course, still be used for decision-making in the context of substantive equality.
However, if used, we recommend developers, deployers, and users preemptively consider how to justify bias inherited by a system due to the choice
fairness metric. Recognizing the possibility of future litigation, this justification
should follow the model set by indirect discrimination and the proportionality
test because bias preserving metrics can easily give rise to prima facie
discrimination.' 94
B.

Using Bias TransformingMetrics To Support Substantive Equality

We have argued elsewhere that CDD, a type of conditional
independence and bias transforming metric, is the fairness metric most
compatible with the concepts of equality and illegal disparity as developed by
the European Court of Justice.1 95 This compatibility lends increased legal
legitimacy to the usage of the metric by public and private actors to measure bias
and fairness in Al and algorithmic decision-making systems.

Determining the type of legal framework at hand is typically a question of politics and the
193
application and interpretation of the law, and may change over time. As we have suggested above,
EU non-discrimination law aims at substantive equality. See supra Section I.B.

194

See supra Section II.C; Part V.

195

Wachter et al., supra note 34.
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CDD treats all people (groups) as equal, meaning they should be treated
the same. The test flags up any disparity between groups that remains once an
appropriate conditioning variable has been applied. This notion of fairness
follows the Aristotelian postulate of treating "like cases alike" and enables
formal equality.
At the same time, CDD enables substantive equality by flagging up for
further discussion any relative disparity between groups in a given population
over a set of decisions or other outcomes. Often this disparity will be subtle,
unexpected, or systemic, but likewise unjustified and requiring correction in the
decision procedure. These findings can be published as summary statistics and
function as an early alarm system for potentially illegal disparity in automated
decision-making. 96
CDD of course has limitations and is not a silver bullet for algorithmic
fairness. 197 Choosing the right conditioning variables is a political decision and
developers can be inclined to choose favorable conditions. However, if these
choices are-as we recommend-published as summary statistics, these
conditions are transparent and are open to inspection and rebuttal.1 98
CDD and other bias transforming metrics thus enable public and private
actors to take a more active role in establishing substantive equality. They can
spark dialogue between developers, claimants, regulators, and courts to
determine their respective roles, duties, and obligations to realise substantive
equality. Where unjustified disparity is identified, processes may need to be
adapted, for example by changing decisions criteria, adding different variables,
or giving different weight to existing ones (e.g., telling a model to give less
importance to salary or career breaks because they are gender biased proxies for
job performance). This can help create decision criteria that better measure merit.
This potential usage of CDD (and other bias transforming metrics) to
promote substantive equality should not be confused with a requirement for
positive action (affirmative action), for example a requirement to hire people
because of their gender.1 99 On the contrary, bias transforming metrics can help
identify talented job applicants that are undervalued by biased decision criteria
that fail to consistently and fairly reflect merit and competence across all job
applicants.2 00

196

197

198
199

Id
See supra Section HlI.C.
Wachter et al., supra note 34, at 555-57.
See supra Section II.C.

200
Statistics show, for example, that people who have a criminal record are more diligent and
dedicated workers in certain sectors (e.g., customer service). See Burdon & Harpur, supra note 4,
at 688. Despite this, hiring criteria that reject applicants with criminal records are the norm. Using
a bias transforming metric in this context could simultaneously promote substantive equality and
help companies hire more reliable workers.
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C. Substantive Equality Duties in FairMachine Learning
Whilst it is clear that the rationale and the aim of non-discrimination law
is to dismantle inequalities, 201 it is an open question as to what is expected of
different (private and public) stakeholders. Legal and policy scholars continue to
debate the existence and specific requirements for proactive, positive duties
20 2
under non-discrimination law for both the public and private sector.
Specifying the requirements of positive equality duties in fair machine learning
is an important area for future research and policy-making.
Positive equality duties can be exercised through the usage of bias
transforming metrics. Specifically, dialogue concerning which biases a system
should adopt, which variables to condition on (in the case of conditional
independence), and which forms of inequality can be justified is key to promote
substantive equality in practice. The use of bias transforming metrics to identify
and question existing and emergent disparity can ensure this dialogue occurs and
includes the right stakeholders; such political determinations should not be made
in isolation by developers, deployers, and users of automated systems. Rather, a
broad and open dialogue is needed to answer questions such as
" Should income be used as a variable to decide if somebody is granted a
loan, given what we know about income equality? What would be a less
discriminatory, but equally useful alternative?
the possession of a higher education degree be allowed as a
Should
"
mandatory requirement for employment given the significant inequality
in access to education?
" Should we rely on recommendation letters and Grade Point Average even
if they have been shown to be biased towards gender and ethnicity?
" Do socially acceptable or even desirable disparities exist? What type of
disparities, if any, should be maintained in society?
These are not questions that can be answered by a choice of fairness
metric directly, but bias transforming metrics and public summary statistics can
spark and inform this crucial dialogue. By using a bias transforming metirc and
publishing summary statistics, developers, deployers, and users are forced to
make and openly justify their normative judgement as to which biases are locally
acceptable. Ultimately courts and legislatures will have to decide. They will need
to develop case law and legislation that clarifies the (active or passive)
obligation(s) to dismantle inequality and promote substantive equality that
should exist for different stakeholders. They will likewise need to clarify which
justifications for disparity should be accepted in practice, and across different
use cases.

201

De Vos, supra note 56.
See supra Section II.C. Examples include public sector equality duties in the UK, and
evidential requirements to successfully justify disparity in the context of indirect discrimination.
See FREDMAN, supra note 50.
202
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While bias transforming metrics cannot directly provide a definitive
answer regarding the existence and requirements for positive equality duties,
their usage creates opportunities for incremental change. This is an important
shift away from using machine learning, intentionally or otherwise, to further
entrench the status quo with bias preserving metrics. Bias transforming metrics
and summary statistics can be seen as a roadmap for societal change in the
workplace, lending, education, criminal justice, health, insurance, and other
areas.
D. More DataAlone Is Not the Answer
Finally, bias often occurs not for any technical reasons, but rather
because a dataset is not representative of the population. Many critical data gaps
exist due to limitations on resources, access, or motivation. In healthcare, gaps
in data for female and BAME patients are unlikely to be closed soon. The same
holds true for missing data on real events, such as cases of (sexual) harassment,
hate crimes or violence against women, people of color, or LGBTQ people.
Cases often go unreported due to a lack of reporting mechanisms, weak legal
protection, and the low conviction rates of cases brought forward. 203
Inequality has many and diverse faces. One form of bigotry cannot be
assumed to also exist or manifest in the same way elsewhere. More data is
required to investigate multi-faceted inequality internationally to promote what
we have elsewhere called "contextual equality."2 04
Recognising this, these gaps in awareness of inequality can motivate
more extensive collection of data about protected groups. It is a generally
accepted fact that in order to prevent discriminatory or biased outcomes, data
about protected groups must be collected. 205 Failure to collect this data will not
prevent discrimination against protected groups, but perhaps make it more
difficult to detect. 206 Sensitive data is needed to test whether automated decisionmaking discriminated against groups based on protected attributes (e.g., data on
race, disability, sexual orientation). 207

203
204

See supra Part IV.
For more on "contextual equality," see Wachter et al., supra note 34.
205
On the practical limitations of data collection in the EU, see TIMO MAKKONEN, MEASURING
DISCRIMINATION DATA COLLECTION AND EU EQUALITY LAW (2007).
206
DWORK ET AL., supra note 130; KUSNER ET AL., supra note 130; Wachter et al., supra note
34, at 527-28; Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It's Not Privacy, and It's Not Fair, 66
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2013); Anupam Datta, Matt Fredrikson, Gihyuk Ko, Piotr Mardsiel et
al., Proxy Non-Discrimination in Data-Driven Systems (July 25, 2017) (Companion paper),

https://arxiv.org/pdf/l 707.08120.pdf.
207
KUSNER ET AL., supra note 130; Chris Russell, Matt J. Kusner, Joshua Loftus, Ricardo Silva,
When Worlds Collide: Integrating Different Counterfactual Assumptions in Fairness, in
ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS
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Naturally, privacy scholars have urged to be mindful of the privacy
208
This is a legitimate
implications of such privacy invasive data collection.
concern and closely related to troubling historical experiences that have
significantly harmed minority and marginalized groups in society.
The collection and evaluation of data is seen as a product of the
Enlightenment. Decision-making that is based on "ground-truth" and derived
from scientific methods rather than just religious dogma was seen as a step
forward. 209 But scientific research, data collection, and databases also
21
contributed to eugenics in Europe, the UK210 and the United States, genocide
during WWII, racist immigration practices and the denial of basic human rights
in the United States,212 justification of slavery, 213 forced sterilisation in the
UK,2 14 United States, Germany and Puerto Rico from the early to the mid 20th
216
Century,215 punishment, castration and imprisonment of LGBT members, and
21
denial of equal rights and protection (e.g., against sexual violence) to women.

VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA : A REVOLUTION THAT WILL
208
TRANSFORM HOw WE LIVE, WORK AND THINK (2013). For a United States and EU comparison, see
Joris Van Hoboken, From Collection To Use in Privacy Regulation? A Forward Looking
Comparisonof Europeanand US Frameworksfor PersonalDataProcessing, 231 EXPLORING THE
BOUNDARIES OF BIG DATA (2016). For an international view, see 63 LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA
PRIVACY LAW: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2014). For an European view, see Sandra
Wachter, Normative Challenges of Identification in the Internet of Things: Privacy, Profiling,
Discrimination, and the GDPR, 34 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 436-49 (2018); Sandra Wachter, The
GDPR and the Internet of Things: a Three-step TransparencyModel, 10 L. INNOVATION & TECH.
266-94 (2018). For a EU and German view, see Mario Martini, Wiebke Fr6hlich & Saskia
Fritzsche, Algorithmen als Herausforderungfu r die Rechtsordnung (2017). For empirical
evidence of mobile data collection, see Reuben Binns, Ulrik Lyngs, Max Van Kleek, Jun Zhao et
al., Third Party Tracking in the Mobile Ecosystem, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH ACM
CONFERENCE ON WEB SCIENCE 23-31 (2018). On online harms, see Woods Lorna & Perrin
William, An Updated Proposal by Professor Lorna Woods and William Perrin,
https://dl ssu07Opg2v9i.cloudfront.net/pex/camegieuktrust/2019/01/29121025/Internet-HarmReduction-final.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
209
HALLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 9.

210
211

This happened until the 1930s. See EDDO-LODGE, supra note 15, at 20-21.
HALLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 36.

213

Id at 25.
Id. at 36-37.

214

EDDO-LODGE, supra note 15, at 20-21.
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HALLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 36-38.

216

Id at 15-17.
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SAINI, supra note 13, at 233-35.
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Privacy 2 18 and harms from slippery slopes in data collection 219 are legitimate
concerns and must be taken seriously.
Setting these concerns aside for a moment, a more fundamental
challenge must be addressed. One could be tempted to think that problems of
bias and fairness in machine learning will be naturally solved by collecting more
(sensitive) data and closing gaps in representation. However, it is naive to
assume that fair and equal outcomes will necessarily result from more data being
collected.
Awareness of inequalities is not the same as rectifying them. 220 Pay gaps
based on gender and race are painful examples of this reality. 2 ' In 2016 in the
UK, for example, there was an 18 to 23% gap in wages between men and women
(depending on the sector).222 Gender discrepancies are nothing new, and yet
extensive knowledge of them has not yet led to their elimination around the
world.223
Their persistence suggests that significant political, social, and legal
effort is needed to overcome well-established social and economic inequality.
These are longstanding challenges that cannot be solved through technological
fixes or by simply choosing the right metric to measure fairness in machine
learning. Rather, open and collaborative dialogue involving computer scientists
and developers, lawyers, ethicists, social scientists, regulators, the general
public, and many others is essential.
Countering inequalities requires intentional and often cost-intensive
changes to decision processes, business models, and policies. To justify further
collection and usage of sensitive data, it is necessary to first demonstrate serious
commitment and political will to rectifying inequality.
A first step towards demonstrating this commitment in practice is
through proactive fulfilment of positive duties around substantive equality.
Choosing to maintain the status quo by using bias preserving fairness metrics

218
On how data will follow us forever, see VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE (2011)
(ebook).
219
For a discussion of surveillance and chilling effects, see Jon Penney, Chilling Effects:
Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117 (2016).
220
EDDO-LODGE, supranote 15, at 208.

221

Fredman, supra note 86, at 6.

222

See SAINI, supra note 13, at 6-7 (citing statistics from 2016).

223

The global gender pay gap varies greatly from country to country. A World Economic

Forum study published in 2020 shows how countries around the world have closed their gaps since
2006. Western Europe has been the best performing, with countries such as Iceland (87.7), Norway
(84.2), Finland (83.2) and Sweden (82.0) leading the way. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL
GENDER GAP REPORT 2020, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFGGGR_2020.pdf. However, in
terms of economic participation and opportunity Western Europe lags behind (69.3%) other
players such as North Africa (75.6%), Eastern Europe, and Central Asia (72.2%). Id. North

America has closed 73% of its pay gap, sub-Saharan Africa has closed 68% and South Asia two
thirds. Id.; see also PEREZ, supra note 17, at 75-78.
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cannot be considered a neutral choice in this regard; rather, it must be understood
as a legally significant choice requiring explicit consideration by Al developers,
users, and regulators going forward.
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Appendix 1 - Table of Fairness Metrics
Table 1 a shows whether standard defmitions of algorithmic fairness are
bias preserving and satisfied by a perfect classifier. The definitions of fairness
considered are those from a 2018 "state of the art" survey paper by Verma and
Rubin.224
In practice, machine learning practitioners do not simply look for a
system that (approximately) satisfies a particular fairness definition-as many
fairness definitions can be satisfied by constant classifiers. Instead, they look for
a classifier that is as accurate as possible, while still satisfying the fairness metric.
As such perfect classifiers that satisfy y = y and are 100% accurate are an
important case to consider, as this represents the ideal behavior of a classifier.
In the equations below we use f for the classifier response y for the
target value of the original data. Capital letters represent particular variables with
A being the protected attribute that indicates membership of a protected group,
e.g., gender or racial. C in defmition 2 is a confounding variable that must be
explicitly selected. Where the definition of fairness makes use of the inputs to
the classifier, we write x 1, x 2,. . , xn for all inputs excluding the protected
attribute a. Although the substitution 9 = y transforms y in to a discrete
classifier, it still satisfies the continuous defmitions (i.e., definitions 10-13).
Evaluating if a method is bias-preserving is straightforward. We simply
substitute the classifier response 9 with y, and observe if the formula is trivially
true.

224

Verma & Rubin, supra note 128.
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Formula
P(9 = 1A = a) = P(9 =1 IA= a') Va, a'

Bias preserving?

P(y = 1|C = c, A = a) = P(y = 1IC = c,A = a') Vc, a, a'

X

P(9 = 11y =1, A = a) = P(9 = 11y = 1, A = a')Va, a'
P(y=1(9 =0,A = a)= P(y = 1y = 0,A = a')Vaa'
P(y = 019 = 1,A = a)= P(y = 019 = LA = a')Va, a'
Or the equivalent formula
P(y = 1|9 =lA = a)= Pfy = 119 =1,A = a')Vaa'
P(9=11y = i,A = a) = P(9= 1|y = i,A = a') l E{0,1}, a, a'
P(9 = ily = i,A = a) = P(9 = fly = i,A = a') Vi E (0,1),aa'
P(9 = y)A = a) = P(9 = yA= a') Vi E (0,1, a, a'
P(9= 0 Ay =1 A= a) P(= 0 Ay =1A=a')
Va, a'
= a')
P(9 1A0= 1A= a) P =9 AO= A
P(y = 1 = t, A = a)= P(y =119 = t, A = a') Vt E R a, a'
P(y = i1 = t,A =a)= P(y = 119= t,A = a')VI E (0,), tER aa'
E(9[y = 1,A = a)= E(9y =1, A = a') Va,a'
E (91y = 0,A = a) = E(fy = 0, A= a') Va, a'
9(x,x 2,...x,a) =9(x1,x2 ,x-,,a')Vaa'

~
~

parit_
2.

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Conditional statistical (demographic)

parity, Conditional independence"
Predictive parity, outcome test-'
False positive error rate balance'
False negative error rate balance,'
Equal opportunity"
Equalized odds"'

Conditional use accuracy equality""
Overall accuracy equality"
Treatment equality,

Test-fairness or calibrations
Wellcalibrations
Balance for positive class"
Balance for negative class"
Causal discrimination" (direct
discrimination)
15. Fairness through unawareness"
16. Fairness through awareness"'
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

17. Counterfactual fairness""
18. No unresolved discriminations'
(causal variant of 2)
19. No proxy discrimination20. Path based causal reasoninge

9 if a function of x only and not protected attribute a
The distribution of randomized outcomes is k-Lipschitz with
respect to a metric defined over the inputs
A_(xx2,..,x,a)= 9A.,(xc,x2.,x,a)
9A.. .X, s(x1,x 2,. ,x a)= 9A'-xkk(X"2'...,xa,a)

X

~

~

~
*

Fairness metrics
1. Group fairness, Statistical (demographic)

*

2021]

X
X
X

No simple formula
X
No simple formula
X
Table la - Bias preserving fairness metrics (full table)
* Indicates that a perfect classifier satisfying Y = 9 would always satisfy this definition if perfect predictions can be made without
explicitly using the protected attribute such as race or sex.
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